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HHS STAKEHOLDER RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF
STATUTORY ENTRENCHMENT AND AGENCY
OVERREACH
*

*

Colin Roskey & Tamara Tenney

I. INTRODUCTION
Concerns about agency overreach are everywhere—on Capitol
Hill, in courts, among regulated industries, in the presidential candidate
debates. The U.S. House of Representatives is suing the Obama
Administration on the theory that it acted outside its authority in
establishing cost-sharing subsidies under the Affordable Care Act
(ACA).1 Members of the Catholic Church are likewise suing to protect
their faith-based practices in the face of Executive Branch overreaches
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1

U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, Case 1:14-cv-01967 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 21, 2014);
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
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that would diminish or squander these practices.2 Elsewhere, regulated
industries and affected stakeholders are expressing discomfort with new
Department of Labor regulations governing the application of overtime
pay requirements for companions of certain disabled individuals, despite
a congressional statute expressly exempting them.3 Critics of agency
excess identify a wide range of undesirable consequences of aggressive
agency behavior, ranging from threats to individual rights to affront to
the separation of powers undergirding our nation’s constitutional
structure.
In the health care arena, the consequences of agency overreach are
magnified by the Obama Administration’s recognized goal of “federal
statutory
entrenchment”
for
the
Administration’s
signature
accomplishment, the ACA.4 If the Administration’s policies become
deeply embedded in the health care programs administered by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its divisions,
including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a
subsequent administration will face tremendous barriers when seeking to
unravel those policies—a critical problem given that some of those
policies conflict with governing law and fall outside agency authority.
This is a concern that should not divide along party lines, since both
Republicans and Democrats have an interest in ensuring that Executive
Branch agencies do not transgress the duly enacted laws of Congress.
This Article explores three specific areas in which CMS has acted
in excess of statutory authority, in support of statutes passed almost
exclusively by congressional Democrats,5 as examples of the broader
trend within HHS (and other Executive Branch agencies). Further, the
Article seeks to place these instances of CMS overreach in the context of
2

Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, No. 15-105 (and
consolidated cases) (S. Ct. cert granted Nov. 6, 2015); Zubik v. Burwell, No. 141418 (and consolidated cases) (S. Ct. cert granted Nov. 6, 2015).
3

Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 78 Fed. Reg.
60454 (Oct. 1, 2013) (effective Jan. 1, 2015) (upheld by Homecare Ass’n of America
v. Weil (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
4

See Abbe R. Gluck, Why Health Lawyers Must Be Public-Law Lawyers: Health
Law in the Age of the Modern Regulatory State (hereinafter Gluck, Health Lawyers),
18 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 323, 338 (2015) (identifying the
Administration’s “federal statutory entrenchment” objective).
5

More specifically, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of
2008 (MIPPA), discussed infra, was enacted over President Bush’s veto (383-41 in
the House, 70-26 in the Senate), while the ACA passed the Senate (60-39) and the
House (219-212) without a single Republican vote.
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widespread discomfort with agency self-aggrandizement—both
examining important dangers of such behavior, if left unchecked, and
discussing ways Congress and the courts can help reign in excessive and
unlawful agency action. In particular, the Article recommends that
Congress enact a novel, narrow legislative provision modeled on the qui
tam provisions of the False Claims Act6 that would enable government
employee whistleblowers to challenge agency overreach. Finally, an
overarching theme of this Article is that health care lawyers have the
opportunity, and in fact the obligation, to identify instances of agency
overreach that may be confined to specific industry segments and thus
easily overlooked but that have significant, detrimental effects in the
aggregate as part of a larger pattern of agency self-aggrandizement.

II. EXECUTIVE OVERREACH IN THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION AS EXEMPLIFIED BY
ULTRA VIRES ACTIONS OF CMS
Executive agencies have occupied the spotlight often in recent
months, with Members of Congress, Supreme Court Justices, academics,
and others calling attention to executive agency overreach. Such
concerns as a general matter are nothing new.7 Recently, however, the
agency behavior underlying these concerns has grown increasingly
aggressive, in particular within HHS and the division of HHS responsible
for administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, CMS, in the
wake of the Obama Administration’s 5-4 victory at the Supreme Court in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).8 The
6

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).

7

See Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal
Agency Emergency Powers (hereinafter Boliek, Agencies in Crisis), 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3339, 3358 (2012-2013) (“The concern attributed to potential or perceived
overreach of federal agencies’ delegated authority is almost cyclical over time.
Distress over agency overreach has waxed and waned and has generally mirrored the
countervailing concerns for agency efficiency and expediency.”).
8

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). In this highly controversial decision, the Supreme Court
upheld the ACA against challenges to the constitutionality of the individual
mandate. While an adverse decision for the Administration could have dismantled
the ACA, the favorable decision enabled the Administration to continue pushing
forward aggressively with its implementation efforts, bolstered by the support it
seemed to have garnered—for a variety of disparate reasons—from the Court’s slim
majority. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 83, 84, 85 (2012) (characterizing Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in
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Administration’s forceful attempts to weave its policy goals into the
fabric of governing law make its agencies’ violations of the law along the
way of critical significance. Faced with federal agencies bent on
entrenching their policies, often unimpeded by statutory boundaries on
their authority, health care community stakeholders must be on the
lookout for unlawful agency actions and prepared to challenge them in
order to help protect providers and federal health care program
beneficiaries against agency aggression. The following section situates
these considerations in the context of existing congressional and judicial
desire to reign in agency overreach and highlights the importance of this
issue in the health care arena given the Administration’s concentrated
efforts toward entrenchment of the ACA and other Democratic health
policy priorities.

A. Current Judicial and Congressional Attention to Agency
Overreach
Worries about potential agency self-aggrandizement have existed
perhaps as long as executive agencies themselves.9 Congress enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 in large part to establish
some limits on agency action, implementing requirements designed to
foster transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, including notice-andcomment rulemaking and judicial review.10 Still, for years, Congress has
delegated authority to agencies to hammer out the details of statutes
enacted by Congress, often in very broad terms. The Supreme Court has
allowed this to occur, provided that the legislation offers an “intelligible

NFIB as “a consummate act of institutional diplomacy” that “avoided the
unpalatable result of having the Court invalidate President Obama’s signature
achievement in the midst of a close reelection campaign by a 5-4 vote that would
have mapped the Justices’ ideological leanings,” and as a “jurisprudential
compromise” with many “disparate features [tied] together [by] a commitment to
preserving the Court as an institution . . . allowing the Court to rise above the
political fray surrounding the challenges to the ACA’s constitutionality while still
reinforcing the Court’s supremacy in constitutional interpretation”).
9

See Dep’t. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1242-44 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (chronicling the “ancient roots” of the “idea
that the Executive may not formulate generally applicable rules of private conduct,”
which is in tension with the delegation of legislative authority to executive
agencies).
10

5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2012).
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principle” to guide the agency’s implementation efforts,11 a test that in
practice has served as a very low bar to clear.12 Despite the resultant lack
of agency adherence to statutory requirements, Congress long sat happily
with this arrangement that enabled it to insulate itself from political
backlash by passing broad legislation and letting agencies make the
difficult and controversial implementation decisions—the hide-behindthe-agency defense (“Don’t blame us! We just voted for clean air . . . it’s
the Environmental Protection Agency costing you thousands of dollars in
compliance”).
However, “congressional comfort with the liberal delegation of its
own legislative role has waned more in recent years,”13 as evidenced by
the introduction of numerous regulatory reform bills in the Senate and
House in the 114th Congress14 and multiple recent congressional
committee hearings on agency overreach.15 Notably, in testimony for a
June 2015 hearing on agency excess, Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Chuck Grassley called upon the Judiciary Committee to
“improve our oversight of [the APA]” in light of “the threat of agency
overreach.”16 The introduced bills are also designed to halt agency

11

J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (establishing the
intelligible principle test).
12

See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1246 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(“Although the Court may never have intended the boundless standard the
‘intelligible principle’ test has become, it is evident that it does not adequately
reinforce the Constitution’s allocation of legislative power.”).
13

Boleik, Agencies in Crisis, supra note 7, at 3358.

14

See George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, Regulatory Reform
Legislation,
114th
Congress,
https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/regulatory-reform-legislation-114thcongress (last visited Jan. 9, 2016) (providing a partial list of introduced regulatory
reform legislation).
15

See, e.g., Examining the Proper Role of Judicial Review in the Federal Regulatory
Process: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs’ Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management
(hereinafter Proper Role of Judicial Review), 114th Cong. (2015); Examining the
Federal Regulatory System to Improve Accountability, Transparency and Integrity:
Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (hereinafter Examining the Federal
Regulatory System), 114th Cong. (2015); A Review of Regulatory Reform Proposals:
Hearing Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee, 114th Cong. (2015).
16

Examining the Federal Regulatory System, supra note 15, (statement of Senator
Chuck Grassley, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman) (hereinafter Grassley
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overreach in various ways, such as by requiring congressional approval
prior to implementation of regulations that would have a significant
economic effect.17
Several Justices on the Supreme Court have also taken issue with
agency self-aggrandizement, including notably the Chief Justice, who
cautioned recently: “When it applies, Chevron is a powerful weapon in
an agency’s regulatory arsenal. . . It would be a bit much to describe the
result [of overly generous judicial deference to agency interpretations of
vague statutory language] as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’ but the
danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be
dismissed.”18 In several recent cases, the Court has seemed willing to use
tools of statutory construction to help address this concern about agency
overreach.19 The Court’s most recent and hotly contested ACA decision,
statement))
(June
10,
2015),
at
1,
available
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06-10-15-grassley-statement.

at

17

Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2015, S. 226, 114th
Cong. (2015).
18

City of Arlington. v. FCC., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (dissenting opinion joined in full by Kennedy, J., and Alito, J.). See also
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
multiple cases that “bring into bold relief the scope of the potentially
unconstitutional delegations we have come to countenance in the name of Chevron
deference,” and contending that “[w]hat EPA claims for itself here is not the power
to make political judgments in implementing Congress’ policies, nor even the power
to make tradeoffs between competing policy goals set by Congress,” but rather “the
power to decide—without any particular fidelity to the text—which policy goals
EPA wishes to pursue”) (internal citations omitted); see also Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211-112 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)(“By
deferring to interpretive rules, we have allowed agencies to make binding rules
unhampered by notice-and-comment procedures. The problem is . . . perhaps
insoluble if Chevron is not to be uprooted”).
19

See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2708 (examining the provision’s text,
context, and “backdrop of [the agency’s] established administrative practice” in a
one-step Chevron analysis and finding the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) statutory interpretation to be “unreasonable”); see Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S.
Ct. 1980 (2015) (refusing to apply either Chevron or Skidmore deference when
overturning a Board of Immigration Appeals statutory interpretation as
“incongruous” and making “scant sense”); see Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct.
2427, 2439, 2441 (2014) (overturning an EPA regulation in a one-step Chevron
analysis that relied on the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme”) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
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King v. Burwell, might present courts with an enhanced toolbox, perhaps
through the broader application of major questions doctrine at Chevron
Step Zero,20 whereby courts may find that an increasing number of
statutes raise questions of such political or economic significance—or
complexity—that courts, rather than agencies, should resolve any
ambiguities,21 or through a more aggressive contextualist approach to
statutory interpretation under which courts would use their overarching
understanding of “Congress’ plan” to resolve statutory ambiguities at
Chevron Step One and then have no reason to defer to agencies’
interpretations at Chevron Step Two.22 Nevertheless, the long-lasting
import of King remains to be seen,23 and the Supreme Court will have
20

See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (coining the
term “Chevron Step Zero” to describe this preliminary consideration). Under the
doctrine laid out in Chevron v. NRDC, in evaluating an agency’s interpretation of a
statute that it administers, courts first determine whether the statute is clear and
unambiguous (Chevron Step One); courts and agencies are bound to follow clear
statutes, but courts will defer to an agency’s construction of an ambiguous statute
that is “reasonable” or “permissible” (Chevron Step Two). Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron applies only if
Congress intended to delegate authority to resolve statutory ambiguities to the
agency—a determination often called Chevron Step Zero. One reason a court may
decide at Chevron Step Zero that Congress did not delegate an interpretive question
to an agency is if the case presents a “major question” of “economic and political
significance.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000); King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
21

See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (characterizing the statutory question in the case as
“a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central to this
statutory scheme” and finding that “had Congress wished to assign that question to
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly”)(quoting Brown & Williamson,
529 U.S. at 133). See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts:
Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Rulemaking (hereinafter
Gluck, Imperfect Statutes), 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 93 (2015)(“King . . . may have
announced a more limited deference doctrine for complex statutes”).
22

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (noting that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair
understanding of the legislative plan” and adopting the reading “consistent with
what we see as Congress’s plan”). See Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 21, at
96 (“Perhaps Chevron lives on, but only for mundane or confined questions that do
not implicate the functionality of the overall statutory structure”).
23

As of January 4, 2016 at least 20 federal appellate cases in nine circuits have
interpreted King, primarily citing it for the limited, well-established principle that
“the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme.” King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. See, e.g., United States v.
Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A few circuit courts have
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opportunities to clarify King’s jurisprudential impact on the scope of
Chevron, as early as this Term, if the Court so desires.24
Importantly, as leading administrative and tax law scholar
Professor Kristin Hickman cautioned:
Forecasting the future impact of any Supreme Court case is an iffy
proposition. Often, a case that seemed potentially consequential when
the Court decided it turns out to be a one-off, as the Court distinguishes
and minimizes it into near nothingness. Such treatment seems especially
likely when the case concerns a high-profile and politically-controversial
issue, as in King v. Burwell.25
Present, it is impossible to know whether King will end up
representing a significant doctrinal statement about Chevron’s scope,
““fade into obscurity as doctrinally insignificant with respect to
Chevron’s scope,” or whether it will have an impact somewhere in
between these two extremes.26 Regardless, the fact remains that many of
the Supreme Court’s other recent decisions have showcased the Court’s
desire and willingness to narrow agency deference in some
circumstances. Deference does seem to be on the decline.27

gone further, suggesting that King allows courts to depart from plain statutory text.
See, e.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 2015);
In re Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2015).
24

Briefs in the consolidated contraceptive mandate cases currently on the Supreme
Court docket and in the net neutrality case pending in the D.C. Circuit, which is
expected ultimately to reach the Supreme Court, are raising this question. See, e.g.,
Brief for the Cato Institute and Independent Women’s Forum, Amici Curiae at 2932, Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2924 (2015) (and consolidated cases) (cert granted,
Nov. 6, 2015); Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress at 11-12, U.S. Telecom
Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (and consolidated cases) (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 4, 2015).
25

Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell
(hereinafter Hickman, Unintended Consequences), 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 70, 71
(citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) “representing another example of a highprofile, politically-controversial case that the Court has largely ignored since”).
26
27

Id. at 66, 71.

See, e.g., Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell: What Does It
Portend for Chevron’s Domain, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 73, 81 (2015) (concluding
that “although King was an ‘extraordinary case’ for the Court, Chevron’s heyday
may be on the wane” and cautioning that “our one-time expectations regarding
judicial deference to agency interpretations may require reevaluation”).
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B. Agency Overreach Intensified by the Obama Administration’s
Federal Statutory Entrenchment Goal
Much has been written about the Obama Administration’s
aggressive pursuit of the President’s political priorities. Republican
presidential candidate Senator Ted Cruz, recently penned a powerful
critique of the Obama Administration’s executive overreach through its
unconstitutional refusal to enforce laws.28 Significantly, two prominent,
liberal law professors, Jonathan Turley and Laurence Tribe, have levied
major criticisms of the President’s tactics. Professor Tribe submitting
joint comments on the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan and calling the
Administration’s rule a “remarkable example of executive overreach and
an administrative agency’s assertion of power beyond its statutory
authority.”29 Professor Turley, serving as lead counsel in the lawsuit
brought by the U.S. House of Representatives, challenging the legality of
various aspects of the Administration’s implementation of the ACA.30
Discomfort with the Obama Administration’s executive overreach is not
confined to the Republican Party.
In the health care arena, agency overreach has sprung up in the
context of a carefully designed Administration strategy to get the ACA
(and its other policy preferences, both current and historic) “entrenched.”
As expressed by Yale Law School (YLS) Professor Abbe Gluck, Faculty
Director of the Solomon Center for Health Law and Policy at YLS
(Solomon Center), and leading national expert in, among other things,
health law, legislation, statutory interpretation, and the intersection of
these fields:
The whole philosophy of the ACA on the federal side is just to get
this thing in the door and improve it down the line. It is a very pragmatic
politics. The President’s interest—unlike that of many state officials—is
long term. He wants to get the statute entrenched. HHS, therefore, is
28

Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 99-100 (2015), available at, http://www.harvardjlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Cruz_Final.pdf.).
OF
29

Laurence H. Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 1, 2014), at 3,
available
at
http://www.masseygail.com/pdf/TribePeabody_111(d)_Comments_(filed).pdf.
30

Stephen Gutowski, Jonathan Turley Named Lead Counsel for House Suit Against
Obama,
The
Washington
Free
Beacon
(Nov.
18,
2014),
http://freebeacon.com/politics/jonathan-turley-named-lead-council-for-house-suitagainst-obama/.
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likely willing to do whatever it can within the limits of the law to let even
resistant states adopt the ACA in some way, whether it is by restricting
Medicaid, or doing something creative with the exchanges. . . . [E]ach
additional state action to implement the ACA, it is critical to remember,
enmeshes the statute further in a state’s legal, bureaucratic, and political
web. In other words, it is not that the federal government is desperate;
rather, it is acting with a long term strategy of federal statutory
entrenchment—a common story in the statutory-law literature that health
lawyers need to understand. This is how to ensure that even if a
Republican gets elected President, the statute is more likely to be
tweaked than repealed.31
The Administration’s goal of “entrenching” the ACA and other
Democrat-”owned” statutes has animated the agencies responsible for
their implementation—all the more since the Administration’s 5-4
victory in NFIB.
Illustrating this motivation and pursuit of statutory entrenchment
are the remarks delivered by former HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius at
the November 2015 launch of the Solomon Center. In describing her
work with the lawyers at HHS to implement the ACA, former Secretary
Sebelius stated:
Knowing what the framework of the law was, we had a lot of
issues where the statute was not totally crystal clear. I needed a creative
legal team working with me to say, “Here is the goal. I don’t want to
break the law. That’s part of your job, but the default position can’t be,
‘You can’t do this because we can’t figure it out,’ because we could
never make any progress that way. So I will work with you but we have
to figure out how to get from here to here. And if this door closes, what
other doors can open and how can we move along the way?” 32
31

Gluck, supra note 4, at 338-39 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
Federal statutory entrenchment has been discussed in the context of many other
statutes aside from the ACA. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010)
(articulating a theory of “superstatutes” that become “entrenched” in our nation’s
legal framework). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, SuperStatutes, 50 DUKE. L.J. 1215, 1216, 1231-32, 1237 (2000) (contending that
“superstatutes” become entrenched “after lengthy normative debate” and “prove
robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time” and characterizing numerous
laws as superstatutes, including the Sherman Act of 1890, the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Kathryn E. Kovacs,
Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207, 1209
(2015) (characterizing the APA as an entrenched superstatute).
32

Solomon Center for Health L. & Pol’y, The New Health Care Industry:
Integration, Consolidation, Competition in the Wake of the Affordable Care Act at
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This description reflects the “win at any cost” nature of the
Administration’s implementation efforts in relation to the ACA and other
Democrat legacy statutes—an attitude that has persisted under Secretaries
since Sebelius’s tenure.33

C. Health Care Lawyers’ Responsibility to Call Attention to Small
Agency Oversteps that in the Aggregate Are Changing the
Landscape
Former Secretary Sebelius is correct that problem-solving often
requires having a “creative legal team,” something recognized and valued
by clients of successful lawyers in many practice areas. In addition, the
Administration’s goal of statutory entrenchment for the ACA, or any of
its past or future priorities, could be accomplished legally as a general
matter.34 However, this Article contends that in the course of seeking to
use all “creative legal” means to implement and entrench the ACA, the
Administration has in fact overstepped its boundaries and that this
aggrandizement of HHS authority with respect to the ACA has carried
over to HHS’s other core objectives.
Specifically, this Article takes a close look at three statutory
authorities that CMS has transgressed in recent years—testing a new
payment model under the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation
(CMMI) authority established by the ACA implementing a new
certification requirement for Medicare reimbursement of home health
services added by the ACA, and one in the course of administering
payment for Medicare’s End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) benefit under
a provision added by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and
Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA),35 another statutory initiative for which
the Administration claims ownership rights. While the policies has CMS
has pursued in each instance may appear relatively insignificant other
45:59-46:40,
https://www.law.yale.edu/solomon-center/events/inauguralconference,,(address by Kathleen Sebelius – former Secretary, Health and Human
Services, at the Nov. 12, 2015 launch of the Solomon Center, discussing the
evolving landscape of health care law, policy, and governance and the connections
with the practice of medicine) (last visited Dec. 26, 2015).
33

Throughout this Article, “Secretary” refers to the Secretary of HHS.

34

We bracket for now any issues regarding the constitutionality of various aspects
of the ACA, noting that unconstitutional laws cannot be legally implemented
through statutory entrenchment efforts or otherwise.
35

Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110275, 122 Stat. 2494 (2008).
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than from the perspective of the health care provider communities
regulated by them, these narrow matters have import for the broader
health care community because they represent a more widespread
phenomenon at HHS.36 To ignore CMS’s unauthorized expansion of its
authority in narrow situations allows a dangerous degree of agency selfaggrandizement to take root.
A critical way health care lawyers, in particular, can encourage
HHS and its divisions to stay within the scope of their statutory authority
is to bring detailed knowledge of a wide variety of discrete issues from
daily practice, along with an intimate understanding of the functioning of
HHS into ongoing national health reform conversations. A problem that
is not clearly identified, or whose magnitude is not well understood,
cannot be solved; health lawyers must use their expertise to bring to light
statutory violations—in court, in public comments submitted to agencies,
and in other forums—in order to help prevent further entrenchment of
unlawful policies. Given that “[w]e . . . have a Supreme Court that . . .
does not have much health law experience, does not really understand the
statutory schemes, and certainly does not take a coherent approach to the
issues in the field,”37 active monitoring by health care lawyers and
stakeholders is an essential component of curtailing the excessive HHS
actions that have begun to characterize its health policy implementation
efforts. Regardless of the merits of the Administration’s underlying
policy choices (which are debatable), the Executive Branch must comport
with statutes enacted by the Legislative Branch; ends do not justify the
means in a society governed by the rule of law. Health lawyers must do
their part in getting HHS back on track.
36

Arguably, this trend toward aggrandizement of agency authority is occurring in
federal agencies across the board. See, e.g., Damien M. Schiff & Luke A. Wake,
Leveling the Playing Field in David v. Goliath: Remedies to Agency Overreach
(hereinafter Schiff & Wake, Agency Overreach), 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 97 (20122013) (addressing aggressive overreaches by the EPA); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply
Ass’n (Sup. Ct. Docket No. 14-840) (argued Oct. 14, 2015) (evaluating whether
FERC’s “demand response” rule exceeds the agency’s statutory authority); OSHA’s
Regulatory Agenda: Changing Long-Standing Policies Outside the Public
Rulemaking Process: Hearing before the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce’s Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, 113th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2014)
(statement of Maury Baskin on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers
and
Associated
Builders
and
Contractors)
at
1,
available
at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/baskin_testimony.pdf (regarding an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) policy that contradicts
governing statutory authorities).
37
Gluck, Health Lawyers, supra note 4, at 345. See also Abbe R. Gluck,
Symposium Issue Introduction: The Law of Medicare and Medicaid at Fifty
(hereinafter Gluck, Symposium), 15 YALE J. POL’Y & ETHICS 1, 19 (2015) (“health
lawyers have an important role to play in educating the courts about the health
statutes themselves, and the relationships among them”).
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III. SIGNIFICANT EXAMPLES OF CMS
OVERREACH IN THE WAKE OF NFIB
This section identifies three Medicare program policies that CMS
has implemented in recent years without the statutory authority to do so.
These policies are in a sense unremarkable, as they are but three of many
similar examples of CMS overreach, but they are featured here because
they reveal current, active legal positioning from the agency and include
the same level of resistance to stakeholder concern on both merits and
process.
In each instance, CMS rejected, without meaningful
explanation, stakeholders’ challenges regarding the nature and extent of
the agency’s authority to proceed toward its regulatory objectives, in one
instance even through a year of consequential litigation against the
government in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. CMS
overreach of this sort has permeated the agency’s ACA implementation
efforts, as well as its momentous implementation work involving both
prior and forthcoming Medicare law. As the Administration has sought to
entrench the ACA, its agency lawyers appear to be freely applying that
principle to non-ACA-related policy implementation, increasingly so
after the Administration’s NFIB win. The consequences of overreach,
therefore, are broader and deeper than just the fabric of the ACA itself
and its stakeholders. The evolution of Medicare law, like other federal
statutory schemes, is highly dependent on career professionals at
executive agencies, in this case CMS, to implement congressional
imperatives. The current entrenchment logic threatens all providers and
suppliers with actions that could present significant new costs or
consequences with diminished access to judicial review.

A. CMS’s Unprecedented and Unauthorized Mandatory
Implementation of the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement
Model
CMS recently issued a final rule adopting a new bundled payment
model for hip and knee replacement surgery and recovery, called the
Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Payment Model (CJR
Model), which requires certain hospitals to participate in the model (the
“CJR Final Rule”).38 In the CJR Final Rule, CMS cited the CMMI
38

Comprehensive Care of Joint Replacement Payment Model for Acute Care, 80
Fed. Reg. 73274, 72326 (Nov. 24, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 510).
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authority created by Social Security Act (SSA) Section 1115A,39 as well
as the Secretary’s “authority under both sections 1102 and 1871 of the
[SSA] to implement regulations as necessary to administer Medicare,” as
affirmatively authorizing CMS to make the CJR Model mandatory for all
hospitals and downstream post-acute care (PAC) providers in designated
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).40 Contrary to CMS’s claims,
none of these statutes authorize the agency to mandate participation in
new payment models. Moreover, CMS’s cursory references to these SSA
provisions in the CJR Final Rule—in response to questions raised by
commenters about the agency’s lack of authority—reveal a troubling lack
of attention by the agency to its statutory boundaries.
With respect to SSA Section 1115A, CMS posited that “[t]he
statute does not require that models be voluntary, but rather gives the
Secretary broad discretion to design and test models that meet certain
requirements as to spending and quality” and noted that “[a]lthough
section 1115A(b) of the [SSA] describes a number of payment and
service delivery models that the Secretary may choose to test, the
Secretary is not limited to those models.”41 Those brief mentions of the
agency’s interpretation of the statute allowed for the agency to provide a
more thorough description of their policy-based reasons for preferring a
mandatory participation model, which CMS described as “necessary” and
“the most prudent approach.”42 Chief among these policy reasons was
CMS’s contention that there is “selection bias inherent to any model in
which providers may choose whether to participate” and that the agency
would acquire broader and hence more useful data if it required
participation from hospitals that otherwise would opt not to participate.43
Despite the reasonableness of CMS’s belief that a mandatory
model could produce more representative data that could, in turn, better
inform the agency’s policy choices going forward, it is a well-established
principle of statutory construction that an agency may not depart from
clear statutory text in service of policy choices (without regard to the
merits of those policies).44 Departing from unambiguous statutory
39

SSA Section 1115A (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (2012)).

40

80 Fed. Reg. at 73278; SSA § 1102 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)); SSA §
1871 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (2012)).
41

80 Fed. Reg. at 73277-73278.

42

Id. at 73278.

43

Id.

44

See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(finding that an agency may not “avoid the Congressional intent clearly expressed in
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language is precisely what CMS did here, given that CMS adopted a
statutory interpretation that offered “broad discretion” to the Secretary—
discretion that the agency relied upon to implement its preferred policy—
without looking more carefully at the limitations on that “broad
discretion” that are equally present in the statute. The brief discussion in
the CJR Final Rule suggests that CMS read the absence of an explicit
statement that models must be voluntary, along with the existence of a
variety of models that CMS is permitted but “not limited” to pursue, as
conferring very wide-ranging authority on the agency. While CMS is
correct that the statute permits the Secretary broad discretion in the
selection and design of models for testing, this discretion is not
unlimited. The statute’s text, structure, and purpose together clearly
demonstrate that one limitation upon this authority is that models may
not be mandatory, regardless of the lack of an explicit statement to this
end.45
Section 1115A of the SSA is structured as a set of interlocking
provisions that together establish the CMMI and govern the activities the
CMMI is permitted and required to perform. The main provisions
bearing on the question of whether CMS can make models mandatory
are: subsection (a), which identifies the CMMI’s purpose and provides
overarching guidelines (including a geographic limitation, which is key
to this analysis); subsection (b), which governs the testing of models
(Phase I); and subsection (c), which covers the expansion of models
(Phase II).46 Subsection (a) identifies the purpose of the CMMI as “to
the text simply by asserting that its preferred approach would be better policy”)
(quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n. v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); S.
California Edison Co. v. FERC, 195 F.3d 17, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that an
agency may not contravene clear and unambiguous statutory language in order “to
improve, in its view, upon Congress’ design”).
45

CMS would be well-advised to consider the D.C. Circuit’s cautioning in Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA regarding this very type of agency attempt to divine authority based
solely on the absence in the statute of an explicit denial of that power to the agency.
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“To suggest, as the
[agency] effectively does, that Chevron step two is implicated any time a statute
does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative power . . . is
both flatly unfaithful to the principles of administrative law, and refuted by
precedent. . . . [W]ere courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express
withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony, a
result plainly out of keeping with Chevron and quite likely the Constitution as
well. . . . We refuse, once again, to presume a delegation of power merely because
Congress has not expressly withheld such power.”) (emphasis in original).
46

42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)-(c) (2012).
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test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program
expenditures under the applicable subchapters while preserving or
enhancing the quality of care furnished to individuals under such
subchapters.”47 The terms “test” and “testing” are used throughout SSA
Section 1115A to describe the Secretary’s activities under this
provision.48 Subsection (b) provides the Secretary with broad discretion
to “select models to be tested where the Secretary determines that there is
evidence . . . [of] poor clinical outcomes or potentially avoidable
expenditures”—Phase I testing.49 Subsection (c) permits the Secretary to
“expand (including implementation on a nationwide basis) the duration
and the scope of a model that is being tested under subsection (b)” if the
model being tested meets certain requirements outlined in the provision
(including some based on an evaluation of economic and quality data
collected)—Phase II expansion.50
It is in light of this structure of Phase I testing and Phase II
expansion, that the geographic limitation in SSA Section 1115A(a)(5)
provides critical insight into whether models may be mandatory. The
geographic limitation reads: “For purposes of testing payment and
service delivery models under this section, the Secretary may elect to
limit testing of a model to certain geographic areas.”51 Following CMS’s
reading of the statute as allowing the agency to mandate participation in
the Phase I testing of a model, Section 1115A(a)(5) would allow CMS
either to “elect to limit” this testing to certain MSAs and mandate
participation by providers in those MSAs (as CMS has done with the CJR
Model), or to elect not to limit the test to specific MSAs—i.e., conduct
the test in all MSAs—and therefore mandate participation by providers in
all MSAs. This reading is CMS’s view that it has authority to make
models mandatory.
However, this reading is untenable in light of the broader context
of the statute. The statute first establishes Phase I testing and, second,
Phase II expansion “including implementation on a nationwide basis”
after certain requirements have been met.52 CMS’s interpretation allows
47

§ 1315a(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).

48

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(5) (2012) (“Testing within certain geographic
areas”); § 1315a(b) (2012) (“Testing of models (Phase I)”); § 1315a(d)(1) (2012)
(“Waiver authority . . . with respect to testing models described in subsection (b)”).
49

§ 1315a(b)(2) (2012).

50

§ 1315a(c) (2012).

51

§ 1315a(a)(5) (2012) (emphasis added).

52

Id.; § 1315a(a)(5), (c) (2012).
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the agency, through, the geographic limitation provision, to mandate a
model to be tested at Phase I for all providers nationwide, which is de
facto “implementation on a nationwide basis,” and the statute only allows
for Phase II expansion.53 The structure of the statute, establishing Phase I
testing and Phase II expansion, prohibits this reading because it would
result in the collapse of the distinction between Phase I testing and Phase
II expansion. Thus, when the Secretary’s broad discretion to “test”
models is read in the context of the statute as a whole, it is clearly limited
by the requirement that models not be made mandatory.
In addition, this view of the limitation on the Secretary’s discretion
coheres with the statute’s purpose as articulated in the provision itself,
i.e., “to test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce
program expenditures . . . while preserving or enhancing the quality of
care.”54 One of the main purposes of SSA Section 1115A models is to
enable CMS to collect data, on payment or delivery policies, that could
lower Medicare or Medicaid program costs and improve quality of care
for beneficiaries. Congress has granted the Secretary the authority to test
models in recognition of the inadequacy of available data in many
instances for evaluating policy reforms under consideration. Voluntary
testing of these models allows CMS to gather quality and economic data
that can inform future policy decisions. Mandating participation in
models, prior to testing in a voluntary subset, would ignore this chief
reason why the CMMI model authority exists in the first place—i.e., to
allow collection of information that is absent but needed to evaluate the
appropriateness of widespread implementation of a new policy. In the
case of the CJR Model, the lack of comparable data across various PAC
settings was so widely recognized that Congress passed the Improving
Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014 to
enable collection of this information.55 In contrast to CMS’s claim that
“it is necessary” to mandate participation to acquire adequate data to
evaluate the CJR Model’s bundled payment approach,56 the enactment of
the IMPACT Act shows that it is in fact possible for CMS to stay within
53

Id.

54

42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1). As reaffirmed in King, a statement of purpose included
in the statutory text can be a useful guide to interpreting the provision. King, 135 S.
Ct. at 2493 (“We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated
purposes.”) (quoting New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 419-420 (1973)).
55

Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-185, 128 Stat. 1952.
56

80 Fed. Reg. at 73278.
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its statutory boundaries (i.e., to keep all CMMI models voluntary) and for
a broader data set to be developed (in this case, through an act of
Congress).
Just as the text, structure, and purpose of SSA Section 1115A do
not authorize CMS to make CMMI models mandatory, neither do the
other two provisions CMS cited in the CJR Final Rule for authority, SSA
Sections 1102 and 1871.57 Section 1102 of the SSA provides, in relevant
part, that the Secretary “shall make and publish such rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with [the SSA], as may be necessary to the
efficient administration of the functions with which [the Secretary] is
charged under [the SSA],” and SSA Section 1871 states, “[t]he Secretary
shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
administration of the insurance programs under this title.”58 In the case
of both of these provisions, CMS seems to have picked out the “as may
be necessary” language as authorizing CMS to mandate participation in
the CJR Model—based on the agency’s view that the information to be
furnished by mandatory participants in the model is “necessary”59—
without regard to the limiting language in these provisions. This limiting
language is critical to an appropriate interpretation of these statutory
provisions and determination of whether they do, in fact, authorize CMS
to mandate participation in CMMI models.
For SSA Section 1102, this limiting language requires the
Secretary to issue regulations “not inconsistent with [the SSA]”—a
limitation that would preclude CMS from adopting the CJR Final Rule
based on its inconsistency with SSA Section 1115A’s proper reading as
authorizing only voluntary models.60 CMS must comply with all SSA
provisions, even if a liberal reading of one provision would seemingly
permit a certain course of action. For SSA Section 1871, the limiting
language stipulates that the regulations must be “necessary to carry out
the administration of the [Medicare program].”61 Whereas CMS has
persuasively established the usefulness of the data it seeks to obtain under
the mandatory CJR Model, CMS’s strong policy preferences do not make
mandatory implementation of the model “necessary to carry out the
administration” of the Medicare program.62 Hence, these broad grants of
57

Id.

58

42 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1395hh (2012) (emphasis added).

59

80 Fed. Reg. at 73278.

60

42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).

61

42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (2012).

62

Id. (emphasis added).
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administrative authority under SSA Sections 1102 and 1871 may not
properly be read as allowing CMS to violate other more detailed statutes
simply by alleging that the action in question is “necessary.”63
Accordingly, in the absence of any applicable statutory authorities
allowing the action, CMS has acted ultra vires in mandating provider
participation in the CJR Model.

B. CMS’s Unauthorized Addition of a Physician Narrative
Requirement to the Home Health Agency Certification Provision
Since 1965, the Medicare program has paid for home health
services under Part A and, after 1997, under both Parts A and B, only
when a physician has certified in writing that a patient was homebound,
under a plan of care established by a physician, and in need of skilled
nursing services on an intermittent basis, or physical and speech
therapy.64 These requirements are part of the physician certification
provision of the SSA established as an anti-fraud measure and designed
to curb fraud by attaching civil and criminal penalties to false or
fraudulent certifications.65 In Section 6407 of the ACA, Congress added
a new requirement to the physician certification provision, requiring the
physician provider to “document” that the physician (or other specified
qualified health professional) had a “face-to-face encounter” with the
patient “within a reasonable timeframe as determined by the Secretary.”66
CMS implemented this statutory provision by issuing a regulation that
required the physician to:
document that the face-to-face patient encounter, which is related
to the primary reason the patient requires home health services, has
occurred no more than 90 days prior to the home health start of care date
63

Long-standing rules of statutory construction stipulate that more specific statutes
trump more general ones when potential interpretive conflicts arise. See, e.g., D.
Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (“General language of a
statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply to
a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment. Specific
terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might
be controlling.”) (internal citations omitted); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989) (“A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless
there is no more specific rule.”).
64

42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(C) (2012).

65

42 U.S.C. §§ 1307, 1320a-7a (2012).

66

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6407 (codified at, 42 U.S.C. §
1395f(a)(2)(C) (2012)).
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or within 30 days of the start of the home health care by including the
date of the encounter, and including an explanation of why the clinical
findings of such encounter support that the patient is homebound and in
need of either intermittent skilled nursing services or therapy services as
defined in § 409.42(a) and (c) respectively.67
This explanation was referred to as the “physician narrative”
requirement.
CMS’s addition of the physician narrative requirement in this
regulation represents a stark violation of the unambiguous language of
the statute, based on its text, context, and congressional intent clearly
expressed therein. Therefore, though CMS rescinded the physician
narrative requirement effective January 1, 2015, this example of
overreach is well worth discussing for two critical reasons. First, CMS’s
bold imposition of tremendously burdensome, impracticable, and
confusing requirements on providers for nearly four years—over and
against these providers’ frequent communications with the agency
regarding the unworkability of the requirement and their repeated
requests for adequate guidance—reveals an agency bent on entrenching
the ACA without appropriate attention to the clear language of the
statute. Second, the harm caused to home health agencies (HHAs) during
the time the requirement was in effect was significant and will go
unaddressed, even if CMS never reinstates the unauthorized physician
narrative requirement. The former issue—the significant overreach
represented by CMS’s physician narrative requirement—is addressed
below in this section. The latter issue—HHAs’ uncompensated costs of
compliance with an unlawful regulation—is a continuing problem with
agency overreach across the board, and is addressed below in Section
IV.A.2. of this Article.
In a legal challenge to CMS’s authority to implement the
physician narrative requirement, HHS (on behalf of CMS) contended that
the statutory requirement for the physician to “document” the face-toface encounter was sufficiently ambiguous to allow CMS to reasonably
interpret it as authorizing CMS to require the physician to “document” by
composing a narrative.68 The D.C. District Court sided with HHS in this
challenge, concluding that “HHS’s reading of the statute—although not
the most natural one—is not foreclosed by its authorizing provision and

67
68

42 C.F.R. § 424.22(a)(1)(v) (eff. Apr. 1, 2011 – Dec. 31, 2014) (emphasis added).

Memorandum accompanying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, at 2, Nat’l Ass’n for
Home Care & Hospice v. Burwell, 77 F. Supp. 3d 103 (2015) (No. 1:14-cv-00950CRC (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2014).
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that it is otherwise reasonable.”69 Both HHS and the D.C. District Court,
however, failed to read the face-to-face encounter provision properly
within the broader context of SSA Section 1814(a). Reading this
provision “in [its] context and with a view to [its] place in the overall
statutory scheme”70 demonstrates that the “most natural” reading of the
statute’s requirement to “document”—i.e., that “document” means sign,
date, or check a box—is the only reasonable one here.
ACA Section 6407 amended the physician certification
requirement, which falls within the Medicare limitation on payment
provision, at SSA Section 1814(a),71 and the requirements in SSA
Section 1814(a) that pre-dated the face-to-face encounter certification
requirement require the physician to check a box, write a date, sign his or
her name—basic tasks designed to certify critical information, but not
intended to duplicate, replace, or even supplement clinical information
already in the medical record.72 This makes sense, given that SSA
Section 1814(a) was enacted as an anti-fraud measure, with significant
civil and criminal penalties attaching for fraudulent certifications; the
purpose of the provision is to reduce fraud by requiring physician
certification, with there being both (1) adequate incentives for the
69

Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice v. Burwell, Case No. 14-cv-00950 (CRC)
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148456, *3 (D.D.C. 2015).
70

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.

71

42 U.S.C. § 1395f (2012).

72

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(4) (2012) (requiring certification that inpatient
psychiatric hospital services furnished cohere with the hospital’s records of such
services); 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(5) (2012) (requiring certification that, for inpatient
hospital services provided beyond the 20th consecutive day, there were not any longstay payment limitations in place for the hospital at the time of the patient’s
admission); 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A) (2012) (requiring certification that an
individual receiving hospice services is terminally ill “based on the physician’s or
medical director’s clinical judgment”). In addition, for home health services, while
it was never clear precisely what information CMS expected to be included in the
physician narratives, all relevant clinical information justifying the beneficiary’s
homebound status would already be present on a variety of standardized HHA
admission forms mandated by CMS. These certification requirements existed in
various forms prior to the ACA before they were aggregated and, by regulation,
conflated into the physician narrative requirement under ACA Section 6407. In the
case of hospice, extensive Conditions of Participation (CoPs) controlled the ordering
of services, the designation of a patient’s terminal illness, and the medications each
received, before the ACA substituted its own judgment, and that of the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, by inserting a face-to-face encounter requirement
(similar to that required for HHAs) in ACA Section 3132(b)(2).
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physician to certify accurately and (2) sufficient medical information
elsewhere in the clinical record to meet other Medicare program
requirements. CMS cannot create authority for itself to add new medical
record requirements based on an anti-fraud provision addressing only
basic signature and box-checking as certification. Had Congress wanted
to change the medical record statutes to enable or require CMS to
establish a physician narrative requirement, it could have specified so
directly.
Instead, Congress amended the physician certification
provision, which is aimed at an entirely different goal from the medical
record provision (combatting fraud versus ensuring that health care
services are medically necessary). Interpreting “document” any way
other than signing, dating, or checking a box does not cohere with the
structure or context of SSA Section 1814(a).
Moreover, the text of SSA Section 1814(a), as amended by ACA
Section 6407, limits the Secretary’s discretion to determining when the
physician must complete the face-to-face encounter with the patient with
respect to the date home health services commence. Specifically, the
statute provides: “the physician must document that the physician himself
or herself [or another specified qualified health professional] . . . has had
a face-to-face encounter . . . with the individual within a reasonable
timeframe as determined by the Secretary.”73 Congress left the Secretary
discretion to determine the length of a “reasonable timeframe” but did
not authorize the Secretary either explicitly or implicitly to add a
physician narrative requirement to this clear and unambiguous provision.
Saying that “document” is ambiguous shows either CMS’s failure to read
the rest of SSA Section 1814(a), which contains multiple examples of
“check-the-box” style requirements,74 or, worse, a willful attempt to
create ambiguity where none exists in order to claim authority for
implementing the agency’s favored policy.
Unfortunately, both of these possible rationales can result in
agency overreach and entrenchment of unlawful policies, and can result
from the high degree of deference afforded by courts to agency statutory
interpretations. As noted in testimony before Congress in a hearing
regarding problems with judicial deference to agency action, the Chevron
doctrine “has fundamentally changed the way that agencies go about their
business of interpreting governing statutes. The search for meaning in
Congress’s commands has been replaced with a hunt for ambiguities that

73

42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(C) (2012) (emphasis added).

74

See, supra, note 72.
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might allow the agency to escape its statutory confines.”75 In the case of
the physician narrative requirement, despite the D.C. District Court
getting it wrong, HHAs have some relief at the moment due to CMS’s
voluntary rescission of the unauthorized requirement.76 Still, this
overreach reveals CMS’s propensity to aggressively implement policy
with inadequate attention to the law in efforts to entrench the ACA (and
other Democratic priority statutes), and it potentially represents an
emboldened agency actively searching for ambiguities to exploit as
alleged justifications for its policies of choice.

C. Expansion of the ESRD PPS Bundle in Violation of the Statutory
Definition of “Renal Dialysis Services”
The Medicare program began covering individuals with kidney
failure regardless of age under the ESRD benefit in 1973.77 Initially,
Medicare paid for dialysis services on a fee-for-service basis. In August
of 1983, pursuant to a congressional mandate,78 Medicare began paying
for dialysis services using the “composite rate” system, a blended
prospective payment and fee-for-service system. Under the composite
rate system, dialysis facilities received a single, prospectively determined
payment amount per treatment that was intended to cover certain
regularly provided drugs, laboratory tests, and supplies. Dialysis
facilities billed Medicare separately for other drugs that were not
included in the composite rate (“separately billable drugs”). Initially, the
composite rate payment included most of the items and services routinely
used in dialysis, and reimbursement for separately billable drugs was
intended to help ensure that providers’ costs of furnishing other noncomposite rate items were properly recognized, preserving opportunities
for high-quality care for beneficiaries.79 Over time, as new drugs were
75

Proper Role of Judicial Review, supra note 15, (statement of Andrew Grossman,
Associate, BakerHostetler and Adjunct Scholar, The Cato Institute) (hereinafter
Grossman
statement)
(Apr.
28,
2015),
at
7,
available
at,
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=00FD3227-284A-453D-9A0FF7B9B660F7B0.
76

However, reimbursements withheld from HHAs due to purported noncompliance
with the rescinded narrative requirement remain unreturned.
77

Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 2991 (1972).

78

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2145 (1981).

79

Notwithstanding the design features of this two-part system, dialysis facilities in
many instances faced challenges meeting their costs since the system did not include
an annual updating mechanism or “market basket increase” factor, unlike every
other Medicare payment system at the time.
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developed and practice standards evolved, medical guidelines and
physician prescribing patterns supported greater use of erythropoietin
stimulating agents (ESAs) and other supportive care drugs like
intravenous (IV) iron that helped improve life quality for patients on
dialysis.
By the mid-2000s, regulators and Congress had begun focusing on
the still-growing utilization of and cost associated with separately billable
drugs, for which the system had no significant clinical or operational
policy constraint (other than CMS’s own sub-regulatory prescribing
guidelines for ESAs, and labeling changes from the federal Food and
Drug Administration, neither of which made a material impact on overall
utilization).80 Congress addressed these matters in MIPPA, enacted in
2008, which required CMS to adopt a bundled prospective payment
methodology for ESRD services that would include composite rate
services as well as separately billable drugs, with the expectation that the
broader bundle including ESAs would lead to more efficient care
delivery and lower overall resource use.81 The new system would also
include, for the first time since the benefit was created, an annual
automatic updating mechanism. Congress was so confident in that
utilization reduction result that it built a mandatory two percent savings
into the new system.
The statutory provision establishing the ESRD prospective
payment system (PPS) directs the Secretary to “implement a payment
system under which a single payment is made under this title to a
provider of services or a renal dialysis facility for renal dialysis services
(as defined in subparagraph (B)) in lieu of any other payment.”82
Subparagraph (B) defines “renal dialysis services” as follows:
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term “renal dialysis
services” includes—
(i) items and services included in the composite rate for renal
dialysis services as of December 31, 2010;

80

The composite rate system generally allowed for items and services to come into
and out of the payment system, like electrocardiogram and nerve conduction testing,
though the system’s flaws prevented it from being financially viable in the long run.
See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 97-208, 948-49 (July 29, 1981) (describing system).
81

Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), §
153(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B) (2012)).
82

Social Security Act, § 1881(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1395rr(b)(14)(A) (2012)).
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(ii) erythropoiesis stimulating agents and any oral form of such
agents that are furnished to individuals for the treatment of end stage
renal disease;
(iii) other drugs and biologicals that are furnished to individuals
for the treatment of end stage renal disease and for which payment was
(before the application of this paragraph) made separately under this title,
and any oral equivalent form of such drug or biological; and
(iv) diagnostic laboratory tests and other items and services not
described in clause (i) that are furnished to individuals for the treatment
of end stage renal disease.
Such term does not include vaccines.83
Congress has not modified the statutory definition of “renal
dialysis services” since its adoption in 2008. Importantly, as discussed in
detail below, a key deficiency in this definition is the absence of an
authorized way for CMS to incorporate new technologies.
It is this four-pronged statutory provision that CMS has now
violated twice in overt and dramatic ways with its own interpretations
that directly contradict the clearly expressed congressional intent
regarding what CMS may include in the ESRD PPS bundle—first, by
adding “oral-only drugs” into the bundle in 2011,84 and more recently, by
adding new IV or injectable drugs into the bundle, effective January 1,
2016. In addition, over time CMS has gradually and quietly inserted
additional items into the bundle, a phenomenon known as “bundle
creep.” All of these expansions exceed the agency’s statutory authority
and showcase CMS’s willingness to ignore or twist beyond the point of
recognition legislative language that would otherwise get in the way of
the agency’s desired policies.
CMS commenced this unauthorized expansion of the bundle when
first adopting the regulations implementing the ESRD PPS—specifically,
the regulation defining “renal dialysis services” paid for under the ESRD
PPS.85 The regulation text closely parallels the statutory text at each of
83

Social Security Act, § 1881(b)(14)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B)
(2012)).
84

For a variety of reasons and on multiple occasions, Congress has delayed the
implementation of CMS’s inclusion of oral-only drugs in the bundle until 2025.
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 632(b), 126 Stat.
2313 (2012); Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–93, §
217(a)(1), 128 Stat. 1040 (2014); Achieving a Better Life Experience Act of 2014,
Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 204 (2014).
85

CMS has not altered this definition since adopting it in the calendar year 2011
ESRD PPS Final Rule. See End-Stage Renal Disease, 75 Fed. Reg. 49030 (Aug. 12,
2010) (adopting 42 C.F.R. § 413.171, defining “renal dialysis services” and other
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the four prongs with one critical exception in the third prong regarding
“other drugs and biologicals.” The third prong of the regulatory
definition reads: “Other drugs and biologicals that are furnished to
individuals for the treatment of ESRD and for which payment was (prior
to January 1, 2011) made separately under Title XVIII of the Act
(including drugs and biologicals with only an oral form).”86 The
statutory text, in contrast, provides for “any oral equivalent of such drug
or biological.”87 CMS’s change in terminology here, while subtle, results
in a statutory construction that defies logic and an agency policy that
flagrantly departs from the congressional limitations contained in the
statute.
One point of similarity between the statutory and regulatory text is
that both clearly identify this prong as including drugs for which payment
was made prior to the January 1, 2011 implementation date of the ESRD
PPS (i.e., drugs that existed and were reimbursed by Medicare as
separately billable drugs before the ESRD PPS became effective). The
statute then allows “any oral equivalent” of a previously separately
billable drug to be paid under this prong, but nowhere allows oral-only
drugs to be reimbursed because, by definition, an oral-only drug cannot
be the “equivalent” of any non-oral drug. Drugs paid as separately
billable before 2011 could have “oral equivalent” versions of them
developed later and reimbursed under this prong, but because an oralterms, and adding or amending numerous other ESRD-related regulations). The
regulatory definition reads:
Renal dialysis services. Effective January 1, 2011, the following items and services
are considered “renal dialysis services,” and paid under the ESRD prospective
payment system under section 1881(b)(14) of the Act:
(1) Items and services included in the composite rate for renal dialysis services as of
December 31, 2010;
(2) Erythropoiesis stimulating agents and any oral form of such agents that are
furnished to individuals for the treatment of ESRD;
(3) Other drugs and biologicals that are furnished to individuals for the treatment of
ESRD and for which payment was (prior to January 1, 2011) made separately under
Title XVIII of the Act (including drugs and biologicals with only an oral form),
(4) Diagnostic laboratory tests and other items and services not described in
paragraph (1) of this definition that are furnished to individuals for the treatment of
ESRD.
(5) Renal dialysis services do not include those services that are not essential for the
delivery of maintenance dialysis. 42 C.F.R. § 413.171 (2015).
86
87

42 C.F.R. § 413.171(3) (2015) (emphasis added).

42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). For purposes of this prong,
“such drug or biological” refers to drugs “furnished to individuals for the treatment
of end stage renal disease and for which payment was (before the application of this
paragraph) made separately under this title,” i.e., separately billable drugs. Id.
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only drug would not be “equivalent” to any separately billable drug, it
cannot be reimbursed under this prong.
Despite this clear textual limitation from the statute, CMS added
oral-only drugs into the regulation text, stating at the time, “. . .we
believe that when the definition is viewed as a whole, it suggests a
comprehensive definition that wraps in all items and services related to
outpatient renal dialysis that are furnished to individuals for the treatment
of ESRD.”88 Further, CMS contended that even if oral-only drugs could
not fit in the third prong of the statutory definition, they could fit in the
fourth prong, which the agency described as a “catchall category.”89 This
explanation, which fails to grapple with the precise text of the statute,
demonstrates CMS’s eagerness to locate an expansive “catchall,” or
broad Secretarial discretion, enabling its desired policy to proceed.
A careful look at the “catchall” in prong (iv) of the statutory
definition, however, shows that this prong is not the open-ended
invitation for CMS to add any and all items and services into the bundle
that CMS suggests it is. Specifically, the category includes “diagnostic
laboratory tests and other items and services not described in clause (i)
that are furnished to individuals for the treatment of end stage renal
disease.”90 In its efforts toward unconstrained bundle expansion, CMS
has completely read this limiting language out of the text, using the
“catchall” to cover any items or services at all, provided they were
related to dialysis treatment,91 and sometimes when such items bore no
connection to dialysis treatment but were inserted into the PPS for
CMS’s or the patient’s convenience.92 When the provision is read as
88

75 Fed. Reg. at 49040.

89

Id.

90

42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B)(iv) (2012) (emphasis added).

91

75 Fed. Reg. at 49040. More recently, CMS has articulated this same overly
broad reading of the provision, stating, “We also read section 1881(b)(14)(B)(iv) as
specifying a different category of items that must be included in the bundle—that is,
items and services, which includes drugs and biologicals, not specified by sections
1881(b)(14)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii).” End-Stage Renal Disease, 80 Fed. Reg. 68968,
69016 (Nov. 6, 2015) (emphasis added). Significantly, the statutory text does not
extend the catchall to items and services not described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii), but
rather only to “items and services not described in clause (i),” and CMS simply adds
in “(ii) and (iii)” in direct contradiction of the statutory language.
92

For example, rather than requiring patients to make a separate trip to a clinical
laboratory for phlebotomy services, the ESRD PPS for a time included a number of
tests unrelated to the treatment of ESRD, since it would be more convenient for
patients to have all of their testing—both ESRD- and non-ESRD related—initiated
at the same site of service, namely the ESRD facility. CMS has since adjusted this
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written, the limiting phrase restricts the “catchall” to items and services
“not described in clause (i),” meaning items and services of the sort that
might have been included in the original composite rate—i.e., not drugs.
The statute, with its four specific categories, clearly and precisely handles
reimbursement for drugs in prongs (ii) and (iii), whereas it addresses
composite rate items in prong (i) and a limited set of other dialysisrelated items and services in prong (iv). While there may be room for
discussion and disagreement over the scope of prong (iv) with regard to
which “other items and services” are in fact provided “for the treatment
of [ESRD],” that prong simply cannot accommodate drugs given the
structure of the statutory definition. CMS’s departure from the statutory
text here foreshadowed future statutory violations by CMS in service of
the same core objective—liberal expansion of the bundle in relentless
pursuit of cost-savings with blind, or willful, disregard to statutory
limitations on the agency’s discretion.
Since implementing the ESRD PPS, CMS has continued to
gradually add items and services into the bundle. For example, it has
issued sub-regulatory guidance to contractors adding such items as
venous catheter covers and other supplies, certain laboratory tests not
related to the treatment of ESRD, and drugs.93 CMS has acknowledged
this practice, for instance noting in the calendar year (CY) 2016 ESRD
PPS Final Rule:
We’ve added new drugs to the ESRD PPS bundled payment
consistent with this policy [of adding new drugs into the bundle when
they fit into existing functional categories] in the years since the ESRD
PPS was implemented and announced those additions using change
requests. These decisions have not been controversial because the drugs
were substantially the same as other drugs in the functional category.94
This continual expansion of the bundle, known as “bundle creep,”
has been controversial, despite what CMS insisted here. The dialysis
industry has repeatedly urged CMS to refrain from adding new items or
position and has allowed facilities to designate such non-ESRD related tests with an
“AY” modifier and to bill separately for them.
93

See, e.g., CMS, Transmittal 2588 (Nov. 5, 2012), available at
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Transmittals/Downloads/R2588CP.pdf (adding peginesatide to
the bundle); CMS, Transmittal 2949 (May 7, 2014), available at,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Transmittals/Downloads/R2949CP.pdf
(adding
ferric
carboxymaltose to the bundle).
94

80 Fed. Reg. at 69017.
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services to the bundle outside of rulemaking, without adequate funding,
and most importantly, when those items and services do not constitute
“renal dialysis services.” CMS took a partial step toward acknowledging
the latter concern in its December 2014 update to the Medicare Benefit
Policy Manual, in which it noted throughout that only “renal dialysis
services” that are “related to the treatment of ESRD” properly belong in
the ESRD PPS.95 Still, the revisions in the Medicare Benefit Policy
Manual may be a symbolic victory; to the extent that bundle creep has
not been forestalled, it demonstrates the broader, dangerous trend of
agencies slowly usurping more and more authority in small ways that
eventually add up to a significant acquisition of unwarranted authority.
CMS’s most recent major departure from the statutory definition
of “renal dialysis services” came with the agency’s decision to add new
IV or injectable drugs into the bundle. In the CY 2016 ESRD PPS Final
Rule, CMS adopted a process for adding new injectable and IV products
into the ESRD PPS bundle, contending that both Section 217(c) of the
Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA)96 and the statutory
definition of “renal dialysis services”97 give the agency authority to do
so.98 However, neither of these statutes, in fact, confers upon the agency
the authority it has claimed. While PAMA Section 217(c) directed the
Secretary to “establish a process” for “including new injectable and
intravenous products into the bundled payment under such system,”99 it
did not revise or supplant the existing “renal dialysis services” definition
in the SSA, nor did it separately authorize CMS to implement that
process without regard to the statutory definition. Section 217(c) of
PAMA and the “renal dialysis services” definition must be read in
conjunction with one another under the well-established statutory
construction principle disfavoring repeals by implication, which dictates
that subsequent statutes do not replace preexisting laws unless Congress
has clearly indicated so.100 Accordingly, while PAMA Section 217(c)
95

See, e.g., CMS, Medicare Benefit Policy Manual (CMS Pub. 100-02), Ch. 11, at
§§ 20, 20.2A, 20.3 (rev. Dec. 2014), available at, https://www.cms.gov/Regulationsand-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Internet-Only-Manuals-IomsItems/Cms012673.html.
96

Pub. L. No. 113-93.

97

42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B) (2012).

98

80 Fed. Reg. at 69016.

99

Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, § 217(c).

100

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (“[R]epeals by
implication are not favored . . . and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is
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requires CMS to design a process for adding new IV or injectable drugs
to the bundle, the narrowly tailored categories of the “renal dialysis
services” definition prohibit CMS from employing that process to add
such drugs into the bundle without further congressional action.101
More specifically, none of the four prongs of the “renal dialysis
services” statutory definition can accommodate new IV or injectable
drugs. The first prong explicitly includes only composite rate items and
services paid for as of December 31, 2010, thus precluding the addition
of any new items under this prong. The second prong is limited to
Epogen (EPO) and oral forms of ESAs and, as such, will not allow new
non-ESA IV or injectable drugs. Prong (iii) is date-stamped and tied to
previously reimbursed items (i.e., separately billable drugs paid for prior
to January 1, 2011) and also includes “any oral equivalent of such drug or
biological” (i.e., separately billable drug)—so presumably it can
accommodate new oral equivalent drugs here, but not new IV or
injectable drugs. This leaves prong (iv), which, far from being the
expansive “catchall” that CMS has treated it as, is limited to certain
“other items and services not described in clause (i),” indicating its
unavailability for drugs, which are handled specifically and completely
by prongs (ii) and (iii).102 Hence, in the absence of explicit congressional
authorization to implement the drug designation process, CMS is
brazenly pursuing policy without regard to the governing statute.

clear and manifest.”) (internal citations omitted); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 293
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “[w]e
have not found any implied repeal of a statute since 1975. And outside the antitrust
context, we appear not to have found an implied repeal of a statute since 1917”)
(internal citations omitted).
101

Even on the view that PAMA Section 217(c)’s directive for CMS to “establish a
process” is ambiguous with respect to whether “establish” means “design” (without
implementing) versus “put into practice,” such ambiguity would not justify CMS
beginning to implement that process; because the “renal dialysis services” definition
so clearly lacks space to accommodate new IV or injectable drugs, any ambiguity
regarding the meaning of “establish” must be resolved in favor of “design” (without
implementing), lest the “renal dialysis services” definition be violated. PAMA
Section 217(c) did not authorize repeal by implication of the existing “renal dialysis
services” statutory definition. See Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 524 (requiring “clear and
manifest” congressional “intent to repeal” in order to interpret a later statute as
impliedly repealing a preexisting one).
102

42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B)(iv) (emphasis added).
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IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS
DISCUSSION
In each example discussed above, CMS adopted an interpretation
of the relevant statutory provision that enlarged the agency’s authority
and allowed it to pursue its chosen program goals. Each agency
overreach, in isolation, has caused significant difficulty for the health
care providers directly subject to the ultra vires agency action.
Moreover, health care providers who have escaped the direct effects of
these specific overreaches should still take note because these relatively
narrow instances are part of a more widespread trend within CMS (and
HHS more generally) to expand its authority. Every time the agency
cites the Secretary’s “broad discretion” and proceeds to act in excess of
actual statutory authority—and wins or is unchallenged—it becomes
easier for the agency to do this again the next time. This pattern of
adopting unsupportable statutory interpretations that facilitate the
agency’s chosen policies and increase its authority is, thus, potentially
problematic to all parties under the regulatory authority of CMS.

A. Major Challenges Presented to Providers and Beneficiaries by
Each Instance of CMS Overreach
Hospitals mandated to participate in the CJR Model, HHAs
subjected to the impracticable physician narrative requirement, and
dialysis facilities obligated under an ever-expanding bundle have all
suffered from CMS’s unauthorized actions. In each instance, Congress
had written an unambiguous statutory provision that CMS is obligated to
follow. This section discusses the practical consequences to regulated
parties and others affected by these abuses of authority.
1. Challenges for Acute Care Hospitals, Downstream Providers, and
Beneficiaries Under the CJR Model

It is important to understand that whereas CMS has mandated
participation in the CJR Model by acute care hospitals in designated
MSAs, the structure of the CJR Model effectively mandates participation
in the model by PAC providers that serve beneficiaries treated in these
hospitals. That is, under the model, CMS pays the hospital a single
bundled payment amount to cover the hip or knee joint replacement
procedure performed in the hospital on a Medicare beneficiary as well as
all PAC services received by the beneficiary relating to that procedure.
Accordingly, since all the hospitals in a selected MSA (with very narrow
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exceptions) would be mandatory participants, PAC providers who treat
Medicare beneficiary patients from these hospitals would have the
“choice” either to accept reimbursement under the CJR Model’s bundled
payment or elect not to treat Medicare beneficiaries—not a meaningful
choice in light of economic realities for PAC providers that tend to have
Medicare-heavy patient mixes. Therefore, any harmful effects of the
CJR Model would be experienced not only by acute care hospitals in the
selected MSAs, but also by downstream PAC providers and Medicare
beneficiaries receiving hip or knee joint replacement treatment in those
MSAs.
One of the key risks posed by mandatory implementation of the
CJR Model stems from the inversion of the appropriate order for
exploring new payment or delivery models—i.e., first, testing the model
with a subset of providers (and beneficiaries) to allow data collection,
and, second, evaluating whether to expand the model more broadly later,
based on data collected, for all providers (and beneficiaries) in the
payment system. In the case of the CJR Model, Congress has already
explicitly recognized the lack of comparable PAC data and enacted the
IMPACT Act to address this. CMS is, therefore, acting not only ultra
vires but also unnecessarily, putting beneficiaries and providers at risk of
a widely implemented, mandated model that could fail with substantial
adverse consequences. It is not a secret that some new models (or
demonstration projects) fail—whether because the new policy does not
save money, lowers quality of care, places unmanageable administrative
burdens on providers, or for some other reason.103
In ordinary situations (of voluntary models), this does not pose a
major problem, since providers can drop out of the model if needed and
return to the applicable conventional Medicare program payment system
Also, the “self-selection” risk CMS is troubled by (because it may skew
data in voluntary models) actually provides a measure of protection in
voluntary models because presumably providers know their own
financial, clinical, and administrative capacities better than government
regulators and choose to participate in models only when they believe
they have a reasonable likelihood of viability under the model. On the
contrary, mandating all providers to participate—precisely to avoid selfselection bias—removes this built-in protection for providers and the
patients they serve. By characterizing self-selection as a hurdle to be

103

See, e.g., Deborah Peikes, et al., Effects of Care Coordination on Hospitalization,
Quality of Care, and Health Care Expenditures Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 301
J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 603 (2009).
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overcome in pursuit of more “robust” data104 rather than the valuable
provider and beneficiary protection mechanism that it is, CMS has put
providers and beneficiaries at risk, unnecessarily and without
justification.
2.

Challenges for HHAs and Beneficiaries Under the Physician
Narrative Requirement

For over three-and-a-half years, HHAs were subjected to
significant administrative difficulties, confusion, and extensive costs of
compliance by the unauthorized physician narrative requirement.
Numerous Members of Congress were concerned about the “significant
burden on home health providers and physicians in [their] districts,”
including the increased “paperwork burden and cost to home health
agencies which are struggling to comply with this regulation” and the
potential “disincentive for physicians to recommend home health
services.”105 Although CMS rescinded this requirement, effective
January 1, 2015,106 HHAs cannot recoup the time and money they spent
seeking to comply with that requirement for the nearly four years it was
in effect.107
In the final rule rescinding this requirement, CMS mentioned that
“[t]he home health industry continues to voice concerns regarding the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act face-to-face encounter
documentation requirement” and explained its decision to remove the
narrative requirement as “an effort to simplify the face-to-face encounter
regulations, reduce burden for HHAs and physicians, and to mitigate
instances where physicians and HHAs unintentionally fail to comply with

104

80 Fed. Reg. at 73276.

105

See Letter from Members of Congress to Marilyn Tavenner, CMS Administrator
(Sept.
17,
2013),
available
at
http://www.hcanys.org/documents/FinalF2FLetter091713.pdf. The 75 signatures on this letter
represent both Democrats and Republicans from across the country whose
constituencies include urban, suburban, and rural populations.
106

Calendar Year 2015 Home Health Prospective Payment System Update, 79 Fed.
Reg. 66032 (Nov. 6, 2014).
107

Realistically, HHAs would have begun to incur compliance costs prior to the
April 2011 effective date of the physician narrative requirement, nearer to when
CMS first proposed this requirement in July 2010, as providers must begin preparing
for final rules before their effective dates.
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certification requirements.”108 It is certainly encouraging when CMS
seems to take seriously issues raised by providers and to develop or
modify regulations and policies appropriately based on providers’ on-theground knowledge and experience. The notice-and-comment process
established by the APA was designed to foster exactly that type of
meaningful opportunity for regulated parties to communicate with
agencies and affect agencies’ policy decisions as a result; regulators
acting in the public interest will care about regulated parties’ concerns,
and it is always welcomed when CMS and other agencies meaningfully
consider regulated parties’ views when respectfully expressed and clearly
articulated.
Unfortunately, all too often agencies fail to address critical issues
raised in this fashion, leaving regulated parties with little recourse aside
from litigation. In the case of the physician narrative requirement, that
was precisely what happened. For the better part of four years, beginning
almost immediately after CMS proposed the requirement in July 2010,109
HHAs petitioned CMS to remove the overly burdensome, unauthorized,
and incomprehensible physician narrative requirement—and, if nothing
else, to provide clear guidance to physicians so that HHAs would not
continue facing unpredictable and improper claims denials from
Medicare contractors. As CMS continued to remain largely unresponsive
to providers’ significant difficulties, the national trade association
representing HHAs ultimately brought suit, seeking relief for its
members.110 During the course of the litigation, CMS rescinded the
physician narrative requirement.111 It is impossible to tell whether CMS
ultimately changed its mind based on provider input, fear of losing in
court, political pressure, or some other reason. Still, this situation may
demonstrate the importance of persistence among providers, given that
legal challenges can potentially spur agencies to retreat from harmful
policies even if the challenges do not ultimately prevail in court.
108

79 Fed. Reg. at 66043. CMS further stated: “While we do not agree that the
narrative requirement goes beyond Congressional intent, we agree that there should
be sufficient evidence in the patient’s medical record to demonstrate that the patient
meets the Medicare home health eligibility criteria.” Id.
109

Home Health Perspective Payment System Rate Update for Calendar Year 2011,
75 Fed. Reg. 43236 (proposed July 23, 2010).
110

Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-00950, 2015 WL
6736165, (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2014).
111

While the D.C. District Court later found for the government in a motion for
summary judgment, CMS has not sought to reinstate the unlawful requirement. Id.
at 10.
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In addition to the un-recoupable costs of compliance, another
problem caused by the unlawful physician narrative requirement was its
lack of logic and basic fairness as applied. Specifically, the regulation
made receipt of an adequate physician narrative a condition of HHAs’
Medicare reimbursement but prohibited HHAs from drafting the
narratives or assisting physicians with the drafting. This policy therefore
unfairly punished HHAs if Medicare contractors determined that
physicians had failed to comply with CMS’s ambiguous and confusing
(also unnecessary and unauthorized) physician narrative requirement,
while simultaneously tying HHAs’ hands to prevent them from helping
ensure that the narratives would be considered complete by contractors.
Over the course of over three-and-a-half years, HHAs placed in this
unfair position faced tens of thousands of retrospective claim denials
based on Medicare contractor findings of incomplete physician
narratives—despite the fact that (1) CMS had not provided adequate
guidance to physicians, (2) CMS’s own contractors were applying the
narrative requirement inconsistently, (3) claims would be denied if
contractors deemed the narratives “insufficient” even if the patients’
overall medical records demonstrated the need for home health services,
and (4) CMS had no authority in the first place to impose this
requirement.
Had CMS not rescinded the physician narrative requirement, this
volume of unwarranted claims denials ultimately could have severely
threatened many HHAs’ ability to survive, which, in turn, would have
posed major access problems for vulnerable Medicare beneficiaries
requiring home health services. Health care providers are, unfortunately,
accustomed to receiving inadequate Medicare reimbursement and
managing cumbersome administrative burdens imposed by payers
(including Medicare). However, providers are not invincible, and there
are policies—such as the physician narrative requirement—that are so
detrimental that they could force providers to close up shop. As such,
CMS should be mindful of how its own overreach can have adverse
effects on the very beneficiaries it is charged with protecting under the
Medicare program.
3. Challenges for Dialysis Facilities and Beneficiaries Under the
ESRD PPS

In implementing the ESRD PPS, CMS has transgressed statutory
boundaries twice in bold, significant ways—first, in the unauthorized
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addition of oral-only drugs into the bundle112 and, second, in the
unauthorized use of a process to add new IV or injectable drugs into the
bundle—and on a more discrete and incremental basis with the pervasive
addition of items and services into the bundle (“bundle creep”). These
unsanctioned bundle expansions pose challenges to dialysis facilities that
are paid a fixed amount per treatment under the ESRD PPS. These same
facilities have received zero percent updates from Medicare since 2012
that will continue through 2016, but still are expected to provide
beneficiaries with an increasing number of items and services in
exchange for the same fixed payment amount, all while attaining and
maintaining quality imperatives under at least three different Medicare
measurement regimes, all of which add operational cost to the treating
facility.113
While CMS often seems to let providers “fend for
themselves” despite inadequate Medicare reimbursement across care
settings, the situation is acutely worse at the moment for dialysis facilities
with new dialysis drugs on the horizon that could be game-changing for
patient treatment but extremely expensive in a system that has
historically had difficulty attributing accurate cost data to prescription
drugs, leaving facilities to absorb shortfalls.
More specifically, an IV version of the single source drug Sensipar
is expected to become available in 2016. The drug is expensive, and its
clinical profile is not well understood, yet nephrologist and patient
demand for it may be high. Should CMS turn a blind eye to dialysis
facilities’ plight by adding this new drug into the bundle without properly
accounting for its cost to ESRD facilities (as has occurred time and time
again over the course of the ESRD PPS), this would severely strain
dialysis facilities. Because these facilities are charged with caring for
some of the most vulnerable patients, it is critical that they are adequately
reimbursed so they can continue furnishing high-quality care and
maintaining access for Medicare beneficiaries. The CY 2016 ESRD PPS
Final Rule suggests that, with respect to new therapies like Sensipar (i.e.,
new phosphate binders or calcimimetics), CMS will proceed cautiously
and develop a “computation” for the cost and utilization of the new drug
and pay facilities an average sales price-based alternative temporarily
112

As noted above, implementation of this policy has been delayed by statute until
2025. See, supra note 84.
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While CMS does adjust the bundle payment amount annually through the
regulatory process, increases to the bundle payment rate have not kept pace with
expansions of the bundle and have been blocked by acts of Congress. In addition,
dialysis facilities must meet quality performance targets under the Quality Incentive
Program, the Facility Compare and Star Rating Systems, and CROWNWeb.
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before the agency simply drops the new drug into the bundle—an
outcome about which facilities are cautiously optimistic.114 But, given
the agency’s long history of manipulating statutes and statistics to its
advantage and to achieve its Medicare and Medicaid program goals, it is
an outcome over which trained eyes should be watchful. The near-term
result may quell facility worries about unfunded bundle expansion. The
longer-term reality is that CMS may in no way be willing or able to
adequately compensate dialysis facilities for the price of Sensipar.
Regardless of the outcome on Sensipar, the consequences of
CMS’s overreach and self-aggrandizing regulatory decision-making
extend beyond dialysis facilities to the vulnerable patient population they
serve. In a fragile economic system, providers, expected to do more and
more with fewer and fewer resources, may ultimately close facilities,
forcing complex, chronically ill beneficiaries to travel farther to receive
dialysis care (three times per week for at least four hours per session),
interrupting their care, disrupting their “medical home,” and resulting in
tremendous logistical and even clinical difficulties for these patients.
Medicare beneficiaries on dialysis are disproportionately poor (48
percent are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid), elderly (51
percent are over age 65), and chronically ill (chiefly diabetes and
hypertension).115 This is a population that, without aggressive resistance
and pushback from Congress and the judiciary, may be the least capable
of supporting itself in the wake of CMS’s self-centered decision-making
that harms dialysis facilities and, as a result, puts dialysis patients at risk.
Congress recognized this uniquely critical role of dialysis facilities
when creating the ESRD PPS. During the debates leading to the
establishment of the ESRD PPS, Senator Kent Conrad, then-Chair of the
Senate Budget Committee, highlighted these issues, noting that “[w]hen
Congress enacted the Medicare ESRD program, we recognized that this
disease was unique and deserved special consideration,” urging Congress
to act to ensure that these facilities be properly funded to continue
providing high-quality care to a vulnerable patient population.116 Senator
114

80 Fed. Reg. at 69025.
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Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Health Care Spending and the
Medicare Program, A Data Book, Ch. 11, 186, 187 (June 2015), available at
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/data-book/june-2015-databook-health-carespending-and-the-medicare-program.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
116

153 Cong. Rec. S2277 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2007) (statement of Sen. Conrad).
Senator Conrad mentioned in particular that inadequate reimbursement had caused
dialysis facilities to “experience[] difficulties in hiring qualified health care
professionals and purchasing new technology.” Id.
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Max Baucus, then-Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, later echoed
these sentiments during the debates on MIPPA, observing that the new
ESRD PPS “would ensure that Medicare payments keep up with costs,”
“giving [dialysis facilities] a little bit of predictability.”117 To balance
these dual concerns for the Medicare program’s fiscal integrity and
dialysis facilities’ need for adequate reimbursement to care for vulnerable
Medicare beneficiaries, Congress carefully drafted the “renal dialysis
services” definition in the ESRD PPS statutory provision.
By
contravening the “renal dialysis services” statutory definition in pursuit
of its own policy objectives, CMS has been disrupting the very balance
Congress established to address these complex considerations, posing a
threat not only to dialysis facilities but also to the vulnerable patients they
serve.

B. CMS’s Expansive Interpretations of Its Statutory Authority as a
Case Study of the Risk of Unchecked Agency Self-Aggrandizement
While acute care hospitals in designated MSAs required to
participate in the CJR Model (and downstream PAC providers), HHAs
subjected to the physician narrative requirement, and dialysis facilities
paid inadequately under the ESRD PPS may already be attuned to CMS
overreach and its harmful consequences, others in the health care
provider community should be alert as well.
Agency selfaggrandizement in one area can reveal an agency’s propensity to
overreach and further embolden the agency to overreach in the future if it
proceeds unchallenged. This means that all parties subject (or potentially
subject) to regulation by an agency should take notice if that agency
develops a pattern of overreach.
1. Overreach Begets Overreach

A primary example of agency overreach expanding from one
setting to another is CMS’s move from conducting only voluntary
payment and delivery models to finalizing two mandatory models in
rapid succession, both in the absence of statutory authority. In the CJR
Final Rule, CMS noted:
[A]lthough CJR will be the first Innovation Center model in which
acute care hospitals are required to participate, we refer readers to the
2016 Home Health Prospective Payment System (HHP[P]S) Final Rule,
which finalizes the Home Health Value-Based Purchasing (HHVBP)
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154 Cong. Rec. S6477 (daily ed. July 9, 2008) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus).
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model. Home health agencies in selected states will be required to
participate in the HHVBP model beginning in January 2016.118
CMS have intended this remark to allay commenters’ worries
about the novelty of the CJR Model’s mandatory participation
requirement by pointing out another instance of a similar CMS mandate.
However, rather than alleviating concerns, CMS’s response here actually
causes further unease, regarding both the HHVBP Model’s mandatory
implementation and the trend of CMS’s failure to follow statutory
authorities.
With respect to the HHVBP Model, CMS identified its authority
for the model under SSA Sections 1102, 1115A, and 1871,119 which are
the same authorities it cited as permitting the CJR Model’s mandatory
implementation.120 As addressed above in Section III (A), none of these
provisions allows CMS to make models mandatory, and CMS did not
attempt to explain why the agency believed these provisions authorized it
to mandate participation in the HHVBP Model. Instead, CMS focused
on the policy reasons why it wanted to mandate participation in the
model (i.e., to gather broader, unbiased data) and insisted that mandatory
provider participation was “necessary” to achieve this goal.121 Still,
because basic statutory construction principles prohibit agencies from
deviating from clear statutory text to pursue their policy agendas,122 none
of CMS’s cited authorities permit mandatory implementation of the
HHVBP Model.
This is problematic not only because it signals a trend of CMS
mandating provider participation in CMMI models absent statutory
authority, but also because of the underlying attitude revealed by CMS.
118

80 Fed. Reg. at 73277.
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Home Health Value-Based Purchasing Model, 80 Fed. Reg. 68624, 68657 (Nov.
5, 2015).
120

80 Fed. Reg. at 73278. In the context of the HHVBP Model, CMS described
these statutory provisions as together “authoriz[ing] the Secretary to issue
regulations to operate the Medicare program and test innovative payment models to
improve coordination, quality, and efficacy of health care services furnished under
Title XVIII.” 80 Fed. Reg. 68624, 68657.
121

See id. at 68659 (“We believe it is necessary to require all HHAs delivering care
within boundaries of selected states to be included in the model” because this
“ensures that: (1) There is no self-selection bias, (2) competing HHAs are
representative of HHAs nationally, and (3) there is sufficient participation to
generate meaningful results.”).
122

See e.g., Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 145; Engine Mfrs. Ass’n., 88 F.3d at
1089; S. California Edison Co., 195 F.3d at 27.
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In both the CJR Final Rule and the CY 2016 HHPPS Final Rule, CMS’s
primary focus was described in terms of benefits of a broad, unbiased
data set and of the “need” to mandate provider participation in order to
obtain this information.123 CMS’s discussions lacked meaningful
attention to the baseline question of whether mandating provider
participation was permitted under governing authorities.
CMS’s
attempted justification of its authority to mandate participation in the CJR
Model was sparse and not reflective of a careful consideration of the
statutes, and no explanation of the agency’s statutory interpretation (only
citation to the provisions) was given regarding the HHVBP Model.
Moreover, CMS appears either not to recognize or not to care
about the shaky statutory ground upon which it is mandating participation
in CMMI models. By pointing to the HHVBP Model in the CJR Final
Rule in response to comments challenging the CJR Model’s mandatory
implementation as unprecedented and unlawful, CMS is evincing either a
woeful lack of attention to the governing authorities, an intentional
diversion of attention, or an arrogant belief that its own actions have
precedential value regardless of the law. Such a “Look! We’re doing the
same thing over here too!” response will not create statutory authority but
can result in further overreach as the agency comes to believe its own
press. Further, such overreach, and the attendant harm to providers and
risk to beneficiaries, will continue unless action is taken to restore
accountability to the administrative state.
2. Challenges in Dislodging Entrenched Policies from the Federal
System

While agency overreach is problematic generally, CMS’s
overreaching is highly problematic due to the Administration’s goal of
entrenching the ACA and other Democratic statutory priorities, which
effectively incentivizes CMS to act aggressively to get its policies
cemented before President Obama leaves office. Moreover, the adverse
consequences are greater for regulated parties when entrenched policies
lack statutory authority or otherwise violate the law. Entrenchment of the
Obama Administration’s lawful policies may be a political irritation to an
incoming Republican administration, but entrenchment of unlawful
policies should be troubling to any law-abiding citizen, Democrat or
Republican.
Once health care policies (lawful or unlawful) are entrenched in
the federal system (the United States Code, the Code of Federal
123

80 Fed. Reg. at 73278; 80 Fed. Reg. at 68659.
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Regulations, etc.), unlocking or dislodging them is an extremely
burdensome task fraught with risk, political and procedural, for any
future administration and Congress, including those naturally in support
of and those strongly opposed to the overarching statutes. For
Republican opponents of the ACA (and other Democratic statutory
priorities), dislodging entrenched federal health policy decisions often
comes with political friction from constituents who have grown
accustomed to the laws’ benefits. Furthermore, in the case of the ACA,
Republican Members of Congress who oppose the ACA also face
hostility from their home state senators and downright political resistance
from state governors in their respective capitals, who, notwithstanding
early rhetoric against the law and its Medicaid expansion in particular,
are lining up to obtain the generous federal resources associated with
Medicaid expansion.124
For Democrats in Congress or the White House who may object to
the Obama Administration’s unlawful implementation of the ACA and
other Democrat-backed statutes, dislodging entrenched policy would
potentially be even harder, since many of them would have been,
passively or actively, involved in the entrenchment. Backing out of
positions long-fought-for would conceivably be difficult but not
impossible. Thus far, with support from Republicans, Democrats have
repealed the controversial tax on medical device sales, delayed for two
years the start of the so-called “Cadillac tax” on high-cost health plans,
and delayed the fee imposed on all health insurance products for one
year.125 All of these repeals and delays were extremely popular with
consumers, industry, and labor unions, however, so extracting them from
their prior entrenched position was not difficult politically.126
124

See Robert Pear, State-Level Brawls Over Medicaid Reflect Divide in G.O.P,
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
Dec.
27,
2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/us/politics/state-level-brawls-over-medicaidreflect-wider-war-in-gop.html?_r=0. See also Jayne O’Donnell, President to
propose incentive to lure more states to expand Medicaid, USA TODAY, Jan. 14,
2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/01/14/president-proposeincentive-lure-more-states-expand-medicaid/78769622/
(identifying
further
Administration efforts to entrench its Medicaid expansion policy before the next
election).
See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong.
(2015).
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The “institutional pathologies” of Congress slow and complicate efforts to enact
health care legislation in the first place, let alone efforts to muster the political will
to repeal or enact revisions to existing law. See Gluck, Symposium, supra note 37,
at 14. See also infra Part V(B). 140.

120

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 18.2:79

Still, the core features of the ACA—the tax credits and subsidies,
the Medicaid expansion, the free preventive screening benefits, and, as
this Article shows, the less glamorous but still hugely consequential
payment and regulatory reforms—continue unabated, despite outcries
from stakeholders and from Congress about overreach and
aggressiveness by regulators. The truth is, unless health care lawyers
remain vigilant from the start, before these policies become entrenched, it
may be too late to ever uproot them and to make a material difference on
behalf of their clients’ rights as HHS stakeholders in an era of statutory
entrenchment and agency overreach.

V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
It is one thing to identify and understand a problem and quite
another to propose and evaluate solutions to it; both parts of the equation
are essential. Without careful definition of a problem, including its
sources and its scope, solutions cannot be formulated or evaluated
properly; without an accurate understanding of a problem’s magnitude,
stakeholders may fail to give the attention necessary to address it. The
primary focus of this Article is the former task—definition of the
problem of Executive Branch agency overreach, by examining specific
examples of CMS ultra vires action, situating these examples in the
broader context of executive agency self-aggrandizement, and urging
health care providers and lawyers to be on the lookout for further
instances of this pattern as CMS continues on its mission to entrench the
ACA and the Democratic health reform agenda. The remaining section
of the Article turns to some potential means of addressing the problem.
This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive but rather to call
attention to some of the options currently being considered and to offer a
preliminary recommendation for congressional consideration. Future
work will provide more specific policy recommendations.

A. Where is the Judiciary?
Judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations has garnered
much attention in recent years, especially leading up to the King decision,
as well as in its wake. This attention is well-placed, given the high
degree of deference courts afford to agencies in statutory cases. A major
empirical study of over 1000 Supreme Court cases from 1984 to 2006
involving an agency statutory or regulatory interpretation found an
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average agency win rate of 68.3 percent.127 Empirical studies of circuit
courts have found similar affirmance rates.128 Of note, the D.C. Circuit,
which decides more than 25 percent of all circuit court cases reviewing
agency actions,129 defers measurably less than other circuit courts—11
percent or 12 percent less, according to two empirical studies.130
Many observers have been critical of these high rates of judicial
deference to agencies, contending, among other things, that excessive
judicial deference to agencies has “blurred the lines that once separated
the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, and the Judicial Branch”131
and that such deference also results in agency self-aggrandizement, as
“[a]gencies are emboldened to take more aggressive and daring positions
on the assumption that courts are unlikely to rebuff their actions.”132 Of
note, over the course of the October 2014 Term, Justice Thomas
127

William N. Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1100 (2007-2008).
128

See Richard J. Pierce Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency
Actions Mean? (hereinafter Pierce, Judicial Review), 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 84
(2011) (citing Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 849 (2006);
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review
(hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review), 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 76668, 776, 779 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007); Frank B.
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 YALE L. J. 2155, 2168, 2172
(1998); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 30 (1997); Peter
H. Shuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law (hereinafter Shuck & Elliott, Empirical Study), 1990
DUKE L. J. 984, 1007, 1008, 1030 tbl. 3, 1038.
129

Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra note 128, at 794-95.
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Id. at 795 (finding 11% less deference than other circuits from 1996 to 2006);
Shuck & Elliott, Empirical Study, supra note 128, at 1041-42 (finding 12% fewer
affirmances in 1984).
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Proper Role of Judicial Review, supra note 15 (statement of Senator James
Lankford, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs’ Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal
Management)
(Apr.
28,
2015),
available
at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/examining-the-proper-role-of-judicialreview-in-the-federal-regulatory-process.
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Schiff & Wake, Agency Overreach, supra note 36, at 106.
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repeatedly raised significant challenges to the constitutionality of the
administrative state and the judicial deference doctrines.133 Some
observers have noted a recent trend at the Supreme Court to scale back its
application of existing deference doctrines and have predicted an increase
in this practice, and as discussed above, King could signal the
continuance of this trend.134
Should the Court continue scaling back its deference to agency
statutory and regulatory interpretations, this could help combat the
“aggressive executive action [that] has pushed [the deference doctrines’]
latent defects to the surface” in recent years.135 As such, movement at the
Supreme Court, and as a result at the circuit courts, regarding the
133

See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1220, 1221 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“Because the agency is thus not properly constituted to
exercise the judicial . . . under the Constitution, the transfer of interpretive judgment
raises serious separation-of-powers concern”) (“[t]he judiciary has a responsibility
to decide cases properly before it,” including “not only constitutional challenges to
particular statues, including those based on the separation of powers, but also . . .
more routine questions about the best interpretation of statutes, or the compatibility
of agency actions with enabling statutes.”) (internal citations omitted); B&B
Hardware v. Hargis Indus., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1316 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(raising constitutional separation-of-powers concerns about agency adjudication of
“claims involving core private rights”); Dep’t. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135
S. Ct. at 1254-–-55 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“We have too long
abrogated our duty to enforce the separation of powers required by our Constitution.
We have overseen and sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that
concentrates the power to make laws and the power to enforce them in the hands of
a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus that finds no comfortable home in
our constitutional structure.”).
134

See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference (Oct. 12, 2015)
(unpublished article) (on file with the George Washington Univ. L. Sch.), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2672979; Gluck, Imperfect
Statutes, supra note 21, at 94. As mentioned supra, two possible outgrowths of
King are that the Court could expand major questions doctrine at Chevron Step Zero
to remove more statutory interpretation cases from agencies, or that the Court could
apply its own view of the “legislative plan” more proactively to find more statutes
clear and unambiguous at Chevron Step One. But see Hickman, Unintended
Consequences, supra note 25, at 66, 71 (cautioning that “although Chief Justice
Roberts arguably tried to make a significant doctrinal statement about Chevron’s
scope, it seems unlikely that his colleagues intended to embrace the most sweeping
interpretation of his views” and that “if a majority of the justices are not really on
board with the doctrinal adjustment, then much like Brown & Williamson Tobacco,
King v. Burwell will fade into obscurity as doctrinally insignificant with respect to
Chevron’s scope”).
135

Grossman statement, supra note 75, at 9.
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deference doctrines will be important to all regulated parties—both in
terms of the level of deference afforded by courts to the agency
interpretations that regulated parties may wish to challenge, as well as in
terms of the reduction in agency overreach that could potentially follow
from agency awareness that courts are not deferring as extensively as in
the past. Either more careful scrutiny of agency interpretations and
actions by the judiciary or increased agency self-regulation (in the form
of closer attention and fidelity to authorizing statutes in the absence of
such a heavy hand on the scales in their favor as at present) would be a
welcome step in containing agency overreach. Much remains unsettled
at present, however.
In particular, the D.C. Circuit recently issued a disconcerting
opinion regarding an HHS interpretation of a statutory provision
regarding inpatient psychiatric hospital reimbursement.136 The court
analyzed HHS’s interpretation under Chevron, upholding the agency
interpretation as “not only reasonable but also the best interpretation of
the statute”—in and of itself a debatable, but not unusual conclusion.137
What is troubling in the opinion is the court going out of its way to note
that “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that courts must give
heightened deference to [an agency’s] interpretation of a ‘complex and
highly technical regulatory program’ such as Medicare.”138
As
mentioned above, agencies already have incentives to push the bounds of
statutory language, knowing that courts are highly likely to grant their
interpretations deference under Chevron. In this light, the D.C. Circuit’s
recent reaffirmation that it will give “heightened deference” to
interpretations of the Medicare statute by HHS and its divisions is highly
concerning, due to (1) the added incentives that this stated position of the
court gives to HHS and CMS to continue pushing the envelope, counting
on receiving increased levels of judicial deference, (2) the fact that HHS
has already demonstrated a dangerous pattern of overreach, which may
only be exacerbated by more highly deferential review in the D.C.
Circuit, and (3) the fact that the D.C. Circuit hears such a high percentage
of challenges to agency action and thereby directly controls the outcome
in many agency cases and also holds substantial influence over other
circuit courts in administrative law matters. Rather than granting
“heightened deference” to HHS, courts should be applying heightened
scrutiny to HHS in the face of its established tendency to overstep
136

Wash. Reg’l Medicorp v. Burwell, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22742 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
137

Id. at *11.

138

Id. at *10 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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statutory authority. Because of this troubling reversal of appropriate
levels of deference to HHS recently announced by the D.C. Circuit, and
the uncertainty in general surrounding doctrinal development at the
Supreme Court, the discussion in the following section of congressional
solutions is all the more critical.

B. Where is Congress?
In light of the increasing problem of agency overreach, as well as
the heightened threat posed by the current Administration’s efforts to
entrench its health care policies, Congress must act to address these
issues. Because of Members’ responsibilities to constituents, many of
whom benefit from specific acts of agency overreach (when they are the
“winners” in the given instance) and from certain elements of the ACA
more broadly, and because of the fractious and shortened work weeks in
Washington, “politics as usual” effectively prohibits (or discourages)
many in Congress from pushing back and addressing agency selfaggrandizement. This characterization does not extend to all Members,
however, as those who serve on committees of jurisdiction over health
care have probed deeply into the conduct of ACA programs in 2015.139
While judicial efforts to decrease deference to agency statutory and
regulatory interpretations could help ensure that agencies act in closer
accord with their congressional delegations of authority, Congress must
do its part as well, despite “institutional patholog[y]” against such action
stemming from party politics (i.e., allies of the Executive Branch tend to
stay “in line” while opponents are dismissed as “agitators”).140 It is much
139

The House Ways and Means Committee and Energy and Commerce Committee,
and the Senate Finance Committee, in particular, have convened multiple hearings
addressing problematic aspects of the Administration’s ACA implementation
efforts. See infra note 147. Senator Marco Rubio, member of the Committee on
Small Business and Entrepreneurship, has led a relentless effort to prevent taxpayerfunded bailouts of health insurance companies under the ACA. See, e.g.,
Obamacare Taxpayer Bailout Prevention Act, S. 123, 114th Cong. (2015). Senators
Ron Wyden and Chuck Grassley of the Senate Finance Committee spearheaded an
investigation into excessive drug prices that were further enabled by the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion. S. Prt. No. 114-20 (2015), The Price of Sovaldi and Its Impact
on
the
U.S.
Health
Care
System,
available
at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=8c1720be-ed5d4abb-830b-e4dba70faa83.
140

See Gluck, Symposium, supra note 37, at 14 (identifying the need for a “study of
how Congress’s institutional pathologies affect health policy”). Congressional
passivity as “patholog[y]” in health policy is in many ways “institutional,” largely
stemming from: (1) the assignment of particular health care issues to distinct expert
panels, enabling Members to easily sidestep calls to address specific issues with the
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overdue for Congress to step up its oversight of the regulatory process
and agency action, and time is of the essence for the enactment of even
incremental regulatory reform initiatives that give Congress and the
public more transparency and a greater voice in decision-making and
direction of taxpayer resources.
Some tools for congressional oversight have long been in place but
have generally been underutilized as a historic matter. Importantly, the
APA, enacted in 1946 and described as “the bill of rights for the new
regulatory state,”141 includes some built-in safeguards to help ensure
transparency and accountability of the rulemaking process and the proper
judicial oversight of agency action.142 The Senate and the House
Judiciary Committees have jurisdiction over the APA, which allows these
committees to oversee the APA’s operation, study its effectiveness, and,
where appropriate, legislate revisions. However, over the years, these
committees have largely failed to hold executive agencies to the law
under their APA oversight authority, as noted recently by Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley in testimony for a
Judiciary Committee hearing focused on the need for enhanced agency
oversight. Chairman Grassley lamented that, “we see repeated efforts
today by agencies to undermine the public’s role in the rulemaking
“sorry, not an expert, not on that committee” dodge; (2) the outsized role played by
the annual federal budget process and Congress’s chief actuary, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), allowing Members to play the “sorry, CBO said it had no
time to ‘score’ my bill” card; and (3) the inherent difficulty in passing legislation at
all (especially health care or Medicare legislation) in a leadership-driven Congress
(cue the “sorry, maybe we’ll look at it next year” deflection). See id. at 14-16
(discussing these and other “institutional features of Congress” bearing on health
law and policy matters). All of these institutional features essentially create a
Congress frozen in its ability to effectively oversee and manage implementation of
health care initiatives in federal agencies, which is especially troubling in an era of
overreach and entrenchment inside virtually all agencies responsible for
implementing the ACA.
141

George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996).
142

For instance, Section 553 of the APA establishes the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, including publication in the Federal Register, opportunities for
stakeholder comments, and finalization only after the agency has reviewed
comments submitted. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). Section 706 of the APA provides that
“the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of an agency action,” though of course in practice, the judicial
deference doctrines have greatly reduced the extent to which courts meaningfully
perform these functions of judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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process—and tactics that render the notice-and-comment process a mere
formality” and called upon the Judiciary Committee “to improve our
oversight of [the APA]” to help curb these regulatory excesses.143
Enhanced oversight under the existing authority of the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees would be a critical first step in addressing agency
overreach by helping ensure that safeguards already included in the APA
function as intended.
Beyond the Senate and House Judiciary Committees and their
jurisdiction over the APA, other committees also have jurisdiction over
specific statutes and executive agencies. For HHS and CMS and the
federal health care program statues, the committees of jurisdiction are:
House Energy and Commerce; House Ways and Means; Senate Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions; Senate Finance; and to a limited extent,
the Senate Special Committee on Aging. Both the House and the Senate
also have permanent oversight committees or subcommittees that each
have health and entitlement program oversight.144 The House and Senate
Small Business Committees are also frequently approached about federal
agency overreach.
These committees have authority to call
Administration witnesses, issue subpoenas for documents, interview
interested parties, hold hearings, and issue reports and findings.145 In
2015 alone, these committees have used their authority to call multiple
143

Examining the Federal Regulatory System (Grassley statement), supra note 16, at
1, 2. Testimony at the hearing covered a wide variety of existing problems with the
regulatory process, including agency failure to comply with existing congressional
and executive transparency and accountability requirements, agency “closed
mindedness” and “circumvention” of the APA’s notice-and-comment process, and
inadequate oversight of “citizen suits.” See Examining the Federal Regulatory
System, supra note 15 (statement of William Kovacs, Senior Vice President,
Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (June
10,
2015),
at
11,
12,
14,
available
at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-1015%20Kovacs%20Testimony.pdf; Examining the Federal Regulatory System, supra
note 15 (statement of Ellen Steen, General Counsel and Secretary, American Farm
Bureau
Federation)
(June
10,
2015),
at
10,
available
at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-1015%20Steen%20Testimony%20Update.pdf.
144

These committees are, in the House, the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee, and in the Senate, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
145

In general, subpoena power is controlled by the majority and while conventional
court rules, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, do not apply, respondents are entitled to some protections especially
under Senate Rules.
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witnesses and hold several hearings regarding problems in the
implementation of the ACA and other Democrat-supported health
policies.146 Despite this laudable effort, these exercises alone are simply
not enough. Congress needs more than a microphone to reign in the
excesses of these and other future Executive Branch bureaucrats
dedicated to essentially flouting and tying the hands of Congress.
Another existing but historically underutilized tool of
congressional oversight was established by the Congressional Review
Act (CRA), enacted in 1996.147 The CRA enables Congress to reject
final agency rules by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, a
safeguard designed to help restore Congress’s ability to supervise
executive agencies’ implementation of the legislative powers delegated to
them by Congress.148 Since the CRA’s enactment, agencies have
submitted more than 60,000 final rules to Congress, but Congress has
used the CRA process to disapprove only one rule.149 Congress’s
underuse of The CRA largely stems from the fact that a joint resolution
of disapproval, once passed by both the House and Senate, must be

146

See, e.g., Hearing on the State of Obamacare’s CO-OP Program Before the
House Ways and Means Committee’s Subcommittee on Health, 114th Cong. (2015)
(calling Mandy Cohen, CMS Chief Operating Officer and Chief of Staff, to testify);
Hearing on Reviewing HealthCare.gov Controls Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 114th Cong. (2015) (discussing results from the Government
Accountability Office’s undercover testing of the enrollment and application
controls of the federal Health Insurance Marketplace); Hearing on An Overdue
Checkup Part II: Examining the ACA’s State Insurance Marketplaces Before the
House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation, 114th Cong. (2015) (calling Andy Slavitt, CMS Acting Administrator,
to testify).
147

5 U.S.C. §§ 801-–-808 (2012).

148

For instance, CRA Section 801 requires agencies to submit rules to Congress
before they become effective, and CRA Section 802 establishes procedures
Congress may use to cause such rules to “have no force or effect.” 5 U.S.C. §§
801(a)(1)(A), 802(a) (2012).
149

Specifically, Congress disapproved OSHA’s November 2000 final rule on
ergonomics in March 2001, and the President signed the joint resolution of
disapproval into law on March 20, 2001. U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA,
Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68261 (Nov. 14, 2000); S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong.
(2001) (became Pub. L. No. 107-5). See Curtis W. Copeland, Congressional Review
Act: Many Recent Final Rules Were Not Submitted to GAO and Congress (July 15,
2014),
at
12,
available
at
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRA%2520Report%25200725%
2520%25282%2529.pdf.
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presented to the President who most likely would veto the joint resolution
(supporting the Administration’s own agency’s rule).150
Still, Congress could seek to maximize the “less discernable
effects” of the CRA.151 As noted by one expert:
CRA resolutions of disapproval can be a valuable tool of Congress
of congressional oversight even if the resolution is not ultimately
enacted. Simply by introducing a resolution, a Member of Congress can
draw attention to a rule of concern, and may put pressure on the issuing
agency to delay or withdraw the rule. Recorded votes on the resolutions
can put Members on the record regarding controversial rules.152
In fact, the 114th Congress has already been making increased use
of the CRA (for a variety of complex reasons), with both houses passing
resolutions of disapproval three times in 2015.153 Congress should
continue using the CRA to highlight and address agency overreach,
especially during the election cycle when Members may have increased
opportunities to leverage the CRA process. This puts political pressure
on those who are up for reelection, and seeks to increase the
accountability of agencies to Congress and that of Members of Congress
to their constituents.
In contrast to the CRA and some congressional committee
oversight tools (such as hearings), which are used to evaluate agency
action after the fact, Congress also has the ability to address problems of
overreach on the frontend by drafting clearer, more detailed statutes,
rather than leaving such extensive ambiguities to be resolved by
agencies. As Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Grassley recently
observed:
150

Copeland, supra note 149, at 12. While Congress can override presidential
vetoes of joint resolutions, as with other legislation, it is not easy to garner the twothirds majorities needed in both houses to do so.
151

Id.
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Id. at 47. See also Morton Rosenberg, The Critical Need for Effective
Congressional Review of Agency Rules: Background and Considerations for
Incremental Reform, Report Prepared for the Administrative Conference of the
United
States
(July
18,
2012),
at
14-17,
available
at
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRA%20_%20Final%20Report.
pdf (discussing several examples of congressional efforts to use the CRA’s joint
disapproval process to affect agency action).
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President Obama vetoed one of these joint resolutions, S.J.RES. R.8, addressing a
National Labor Relations Board rule, in March 2015 and the other two, S.J.RES.
R.23 and S.J.RES. R.24, both regarding EPA rules, in December 2015. Authority
regarding vetoing of joint resolutions.
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It’s equally important that Congress recognize its own
responsibility in the expansion of the administrative state. For too long,
Congress has delegated in broad strokes, asking the agencies to sort out
the details. If Congress is going to ask courts to tackle the tough
questions, it needs to be willing to do so itself by reasserting its
lawmaking power—and by speaking clearly and precisely when it
chooses to use that power.154
Under the existing deference doctrines under which courts review
agency interpretations of statutes and regulations, Congress is
incentivized to draft broad statutes (either to ease enactment, or deflect
public criticism, or both) and allow agencies to make the detailed
decisions required for implementation—a task that often involves picking
winners and losers among regulated parties and/or imposing significant
regulatory burdens on individuals and organizations—knowing that
agency interpretations are likely to be sustained in court.155 Thus, while
Congress certainly profits from the existing arrangement, it must sacrifice
some of these political benefits in the service of combating the agency
self-aggrandizement that follows from broad and unmonitored
delegations of legislative authority to agencies.156
The APA, CRA, and congressional committee process have all
shown their limits. While well intentioned, they have not changed the
subject or the environment one bit. Good congressional oversight can
embarrass federal agencies and, in the best circumstances, lead to
resignations. However, those cases are few and far between, and are
insufficient given the size and scale of the threat faced by rogue agencies
that are more committed to getting their policies “in the door” than to
implementing policies consistent with the rule of law and congressional
intent. Congress needs a new mechanism to monitor and put an end to
this behavior. The mechanism should be neutral enough to survive and
thrive under any administration and any concoction of political
leadership in the House and Senate; that is, it should be bipartisan.
154

Examining the Federal Regulatory System (Grassley statement), supra note 16, at
3303.
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See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 128, at 84 (citing empirical studies finding that
circuit courts and the Supreme Court defer to agency statutory interpretations in
approximately two-thirds of cases under the courts’ deference doctrines).
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Leading thinkers, including Justice Thomas, have argued that such delegation of
legislative authority to executive agencies is unconstitutional in the first place,
though such arguments are outside the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Dep’t. of
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.’s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240-55 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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Moreover, it should give Congress the confidence that the laws it passes
are fairly and effectively implemented within the letter and the spirit with
which they were written—not ignored or contorted beyond the point of
recognition by an agency with any objective in mind other than that of
the Members who drafted, argued, revised, debated, voted, and ultimately
sent to the President a public law as direct representatives of their
constituent taxpayers.
The success of the qui tam provisions of the federal False Claims
Act (FCA)157 in curbing waste, fraud, and abuse provides an apt model
here, albeit more analogical than actual. The qui tam provisions allow
individual whistleblowers (“relators”) to pursue cases in federal district
court alleging fraud, abuse, and government wrongdoing. Depending on
the nature of the case and whether the Department of Justice “intervenes”
or “declines” participation, if successful, relators may recover treble
damages.158 The House, particularly the Senate Judiciary Committees,
have always been Congress’s strongest supporters of the FCA and of
private rights of action pursued by “private attorneys general.”
Recognizing that neither the Judiciary Committees nor Congress can
monitor every action of every federal agency at once (not even the
handful of agencies responsible for implementing the ACA), the
Judiciary Committees should consider a narrow, limited private attorney
general-like provision that would allow government employee
whistleblowers of any level to bring forth evidence of agency overreach
(either in development or after the fact) to either the Judiciary
Committees or to Congress’s auditors, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), and authorize an investigation based on the
whistleblower’s claims. Whistleblowers would need to be protected,
including preservation of their anonymity and other reasonable
accommodations to secure their status as federal employees. If the
investigation concluded that the agency had, in fact, overreached and
intentionally violated or recklessly disregarded congressional language
and intent in implementing an act of Congress, then the whistleblower
should be awarded a remedy, such as a share in the savings associated
with termination of employees responsible for the misconduct, a step
promotion, and/or a time-off award.
Finally, Congress should carefully consider the regulatory reform
bills currently pending, as well as any that may be introduced. Some of
these bills are aimed at ensuring adequate congressional review of new

157

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).

158

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
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costly regulations before they take effect,159 while others are focused on
eliminating existing regulations that are unnecessary or excessively
costly.160 Still others would require federal agencies to conduct “sunset”
reviews of significant regulations—and empower individuals adversely
affected by such regulations to petition for “sunset” review—to help
prevent the retention of regulations that have become outdated or
duplicative.161 Well-designed regulatory reform legislation enacted now
could help curb agency overreach if the next administration’s agencies
behave like the Obama Administration’s agencies. Such legislation is
important in addressing overreach by all agencies and is of critical
significance vis-à-vis agencies, like CMS at present, seeking to entrench
unlawful policies.

VI. CONCLUSION
Agency overreach and self-aggrandizement permeate the current
legal and regulatory landscape, affecting countless sectors of our
economy and society. Such unauthorized action is growing for a variety
of reasons, including inadequate congressional oversight, excessive
judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations, and increase in the
number of agencies.162 Especially in the domain of CMS/HHS where the
Obama Administration is working with an intentional strategy of
entrenching its policy positions, the longer federal agencies are allowed
to aggressively implement policies, the more difficult these unauthorized
regulations and practices will be to replace with lawful regulations and
See, e.g., Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, S. 226, 114th
Cong. (2015).
159

160

See, e.g., Searching for and Cutting Regulations that are Unnecessarily
Burdensome, SCRUB Act, H.R. 1155, 114th Cong. (2015).
161
162

See, e.g., Regulatory Review and Sunset Act, H.R. 2010, 114th Cong. (2015).

As lamented by the Chief Justice in his striking dissent in City of Arlington a few
terms back, Congress has established over 50 new agencies in the past two decades,
and the ACA “creates, requires others to create, or authorizes dozens of new entities
to implement the legislation.” City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Curtis W. Copeland, New Entities
Created Pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010), at 1,
available
at
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ah
UKEwi6jbjZmJPKAhVJVh4KHSRyDN0QFggdMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fww
w.aamc.org%2Fdownload%2F133856%2Fdata%2Fcrsentities.pdf.pdf&usg=AFQjC
NEGfdik7L6aLqBarhOY4KVyR0b0dg&sig2=9PxmyzNAwhmKPZFmmSStEQ).
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policies. Moreover, much of the harm done by agency overreach cannot
be undone even once an unauthorized policy has been stopped. By the
time an illegal policy is reversed, regulated parties may have already
spent thousands of dollars in compliance efforts, not to mention the time
and money it may have cost the party that challenged the agency in court
and the cost to taxpayers of the government’s efforts defending its
unlawful policy. Reigning in executive agencies is critical in curtailing
such government waste, injustice to regulated parties, and violation of
rule of law principles.
Without delay, Congress should step up its oversight of agency
action under its existing oversight authority, and should also enact
regulatory reform legislation designed to address existing, and prevent
future, agency excess. Regulated industry stakeholders and their
advocates must remain vigilant with regard to agency overreach, calling
attention to unauthorized government action and bringing challenges in
court when necessary. In the realm of health care law, in particular,
lawyers have the unique opportunity and imperative to contribute to
nationwide policymaking efforts, including identifying and combating
entrenchment of unauthorized CMS policies and promoting better
implementation efforts going forward. As Former Secretary Sebelius
underscored at YLS’s recent launch of the Solomon Center, “[t]here is no
time in our country where there has been more need for people who
emerge from a discipline with an integrated knowledge of the impact of
law on health and health on law, and what business means to all of that,
and can bring that expertise both into the courtroom but into the policy
offices across the country . . .”163 The Solomon Center’s groundbreaking,
multidisciplinary approach has immense potential to accomplish its goal
of “influenc[ing] regulatory, business, judicial, and legislative policy”
going forward, and health care industry stakeholders will be well-served
by keeping a pulse on the promising work of the Solomon Center.164
After years of health reform battles, the attention of Congress and
of the electorate in this critical election year is rightly focused on health
care. In this era marked by cutting-edge medical advances, including the
transformative possibilities of personalized medicine—but also pervaded
by threats of increasing costs of care, rising national debt, uncertainty
about the future of the Social Security system, and international
economic crises—the need for wise, well-informed, measured policy163
164

Solomon Center for Health L. & Pol’y, supra note 32, at 23:53-24:21.

Solomon Center for Health L. & Pol’y, About the Center, available at
https://www.law.yale.edu/solomon-center/about-us/about-center (last visited Jan. 8,
2016).
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making is at a premium. There is vast potential to enhance the wellbeing of citizens throughout the nation—and the world—with the
resources, knowledge, skills, and technology now in existence and in
development, and at such a momentous time in history, short-sighted,
hasty, and politically-motivated decision-making could result in
catastrophic consequences for years to come. Now is not a time to seek
to entrench political priorities before the clock runs out or to promote
policies that will garner good soundbytes in the popular media and trade
press but that will not accomplish the benefits they promise over time.
Now is a time for robust discussion of health policy, including voices
from academia, government, business, law, and the non-profit sector, in
order to capitalize on all the potential gains there are to be made. The
Solomon Center stands perfectly poised to accomplish just this—bringing
together a wide variety of multidisciplinary experts to debate, research,
and explore policy solutions—and to make a vital impact on future health
reform efforts. Health lawyers should seek ways of becoming and
remaining involved in such efforts, bringing their in-depth knowledge of
the federal health law and regulatory landscape and the agencies charged
with implementing these authorities as well as their awareness of places
where these agencies need to be held more carefully to the governing
statutes.
In order to ensure that the benefits of any advances made in health
reform are not lost due to illegalities in the substance or procedure of
agency implementation efforts, the next administration must make legal
implementation a priority. Agency aggrandizement and disregard for the
law is in many ways a top-down problem. The next president has the
tremendous opportunity and responsibility to strike a fundamentally
different tone than the Obama Administration has, and to set our nation
back on its proper course, wherein separation of powers is respected by
all three branches of government, the rule of law governs, and a shortterm political gain mentality is replaced with a longer-term concern for
the actual effects of policies on all players, not just on the president’s
favored groups at the expense of those he wants to make pay for his
promises.

